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Inclusionary Eminent Domain 
Gerald S. Dickinson* 
This Article proposes a paradigm shift in takings law, namely 
“inclusionary eminent domain.”  This new normative concept serves as a 
framework that molds eminent domain takings and economic 
redevelopment into an inclusionary land assembly model that is equipped 
with multiple tools to help guide municipalities, private developers and 
communities construct or preserve affordable housing developments.  The 
tools to achieve this include Community Benefits Agreements (“CBAs”), 
Land Assembly Districts (“LADs”), Community Development 
Corporations (“CDCs”), Land Banks (“LABs”), Community Land Trusts 
(CLTs) and Neighborhood Improvement Districts (“NIDs”). 
The origins of the concept derive from the zoning law context, where 
exclusionary zoning in the suburbs excluded affordable housing for low-
income residents.  Courts intervened, applying exclusionary zoning 
doctrines, which led to the enactment of inclusionary zoning programs to 
achieve a fair share of housing.  Exclusionary eminent domain in urban 
areas, similarly, has displaced and decreased the stock of or denied access 
to affordable housing through the power of takings.  Under an exclusionary 
eminent domain doctrine, courts would apply heightened review to 
condemnations in a locality that has less than its fair share of affordable 
housing.  But in a post-Kelo era of takings, doctrinal solutions may not be 
enough. 
Analogous to inclusionary zoning, inclusionary eminent domain helps us 
rethink how to fix these ubiquitous land problems.  Indeed, this Article 
moves us beyond the doctrinal muddle and instead incorporates both the 
intellectual musings of takings and zoning law with an assessment of how 
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innovative tools can be practically applied to construct and preserve 
affordable housing in eminent domain takings for economic redevelopment. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Inclusionary eminent domain is a new normative concept—
paradoxical in nature—that rethinks eminent domain takings as an 
inclusionary land assembly process structured through a framework that 
is equipped with multiple tools to help guide municipalities, private 
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developers and communities1 construct or preserve affordable housing 
within economic redevelopment projects.  This idea is particularly 
important where condemnation threatens the loss of affordable housing 
and displacement of low-income residents.  This new paradigm is ex 
ante and ex post; that is, the exercise of inclusionary eminent domain 
would assemble land or negotiate the use of land—prior to, during or 
after condemnation proceedings—to accommodate affordable housing 
developments within economic redevelopment projects. 
The tools to achieve this include Community Benefits Agreements 
(“CBAs”), Land Assembly Districts (“LADs”), Community 
Development Corporations (“CDCs”), Community Land Trusts 
(“CLTs”), Land Banks (“LABs”) and Neighborhood Improvement 
Districts (“NIDs”).  Here, the tools are adjusted from their traditional 
purpose to fit within this new eminent domain paradigm.  This new 
framework gives private developers, municipalities and communities a 
more transparent set of tools that guide the development process to 
reduce the phenomena of displacing residents and decreasing the supply 
of affordable housing.  Indeed, this Article calls for developers, 
municipalities and communities to rethink how to plan for inclusion. 
Part I draws parallels between exclusionary zoning and exclusionary 
eminent domain by revisiting the purpose, use and abuse of local zoning 
powers and takings in the United States.  In particular, this Part 
discusses briefly how exclusionary zoning actively excluded affordable 
housing by artificially raising the property values and the price of rent 
beyond the income levels of low-income families, thereby denying them 
access to residential property in affluent neighborhoods.2  The practice 
 
1. The term “community” is used interchangeably in this Article with “property owners,” 
“residents” or “low-income families.” 
2. For a comprehensive discussion of exclusionary zoning, see Lawrence Gene Sager, Tight 
Little Islands: Exclusionary Zoning, Equal Protection, and the Indigent, 21 STAN. L. REV. 767 
(1968) (applying the equal protection doctrine to exclusionary zoning situations).  See generally 
RICHARD BABCOCK & FRED BOSSELMAN, EXCLUSIONARY ZONING (1973) (discussing how land 
use controls have resulted in the exclusion of those with low or moderate incomes); Frank A. 
Aloi, Arthur Abba Goldberg & James M. White, Racial and Economic Segregation by Zoning: 
Death Knell for Home Rule?, 1 U. TOL. L. REV. 65 (1969) (discussing a constitutional economic 
right to suburban housing); William Fischel, An Economic History of Zoning and a Cure for Its 
Exclusionary Effects, 41 URB. STUD. 317 (2004) (outlining the history of zoning and proposing 
home-equity insurance to reduce the demand for exclusionary zoning); Harold A. McDougall, 
The Judicial Struggle Against Exclusionary Zoning: The New Jersey Paradigm, 14 HARV. C.R.-
C.L. L. REV. 625 (1979) (examining the New Jersey Supreme Court’s actions involving 
exclusionary zoning); John R. Nolon, A Comparative Analysis of New Jersey’s Mount Laurel 
Cases with the Berenson Cases in New York, 4 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 3 (1986) (comparing two 
state court decisions regarding exclusionary zoning that led to vastly different results); John M. 
Payne, Delegation Doctrine in the Reform of Local Government Law: The Case of Exclusionary 
Zoning, 29 RUTGERS L. REV. 803 (1976) (exploring the defects of the doctrinal approach to 
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forced courts to look narrowly at a zoning code’s intended purposes, called 
exclusionary zoning doctrine, which essentially provided that a local 
municipality’s fair share obligation is presumptive and if low-income 
families make a prima facie case of exclusion, then the burden shifts to the 
municipality to prove otherwise.  Part I then links the effects of zoning 
with eminent domain by revisiting the purpose, use and abuse of 
eminent domain for the public purpose of urban renewal and economic 
redevelopment in urban areas.  Specifically, these sections of Part I 
show how, similar to exclusionary zoning, the trajectory of the 
phenomenon of “exclusionary eminent domain”—from Berman3 to the 
modern day takings doctrine applied in Kelo4—has displaced poor 
communities, upended middle-income homes and generally decreased 
the stock of or denied access to affordable housing for primarily low-
income residents.5 
Coined by David Dana at Northwestern University School of Law, 
“exclusionary eminent domain doctrine” is a proposal analogous to the 
exclusionary zoning doctrine.6  Under Dana’s proposal, courts would 
apply heightened review to takings challenges, invalidating a 
 
exclusionary zoning being employed in New Jersey); John M. Payne, Title VIII and Mount 
Laurel: Is Affordable Housing Fair Housing?, 6 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 361 (1988) (discussing 
the affordable housing movement as a secondary effect of Title VIII of the 1968 Civil Rights 
Act); Jerome G. Rose, New Additions to the Lexicon of Exclusionary Zoning Litigation, 14 SETON 
HALL L. REV. 851 (1984) (discussing new legal concepts related to exclusionary zoning created 
by the New Jersey Supreme Court in Mt. Laurel II); Peter H. Schuck, Judging Remedies: Judicial 
Approaches to Housing Segregation, 37 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 289 (2002) (discussing how the 
courts have taken the initiative to reach the goal of residential diversity); Norman Williams, Jr. & 
Thomas Norman, Exclusionary Land Use Controls: The Case of North-Eastern New Jersey, 22 
SYRACUSE L. REV. 475 (1971) (analyzing the use of exclusionary land use controls in the outer 
suburban ring in northeastern New Jersey); Norman Williams, Jr. & Edward Wacks, Segregation 
of Residential Areas Along Economic Lines: Lionshead Lake Revisited, 1969 WIS. L. REV. 827, 
838–39 (1969) (discussing the discriminatory effect of minimum building size requirements). 
3. Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 34 (1954) (holding that maintaining community health was 
a legitimate public purpose, regardless of private or public transfer thus enforcing the 
government’s power of eminent domain). 
4. Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 484 (2005) (holding that city’s exercise of 
eminent domain power in furtherance of economic development plan satisfied constitutional 
“public use” requirement). 
5. See David A. Dana, Exclusionary Eminent Domain, 17 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 7, 20–23 
(2009) (discussing the effects of post-Kelo reforms). 
6. Id. at 13.  Exclusionary zoning doctrine was born primarily from the Mt. Laurel cases in 
New Jersey, where the courts looked closely at local zoning ordinances and provided that a local 
municipality’s fair share obligation to construct affordable housing for low- to moderate-income 
families within its zoning code is presumptive.  If the plaintiffs (usually low-income households) 
make a prima facie case of exclusion, then the burden shifts to the municipality to prove 
otherwise.  Exclusionary zoning thus imposes an obligation on the municipality to plan for the 
inclusion of low- to moderate-income rental units in cooperation with private developers based on 
the regional needs for such housing. 
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government taking if there is a loss of a fair share percentage of 
affordable housing from the development project.7  The developer can 
avoid the doctrinal limitation by substituting the anticipated loss of 
affordable housing with the construction of new housing units at below-
market rates within the locality.8 
Dana’s proposal eloquently tells us what is wrong with exclusionary 
eminent domain and tells us why heightened judicial review in takings 
cases is important to protect property owners and residents from 
displacement and from the loss of affordable housing.  However, his 
doctrinal proposal does not show us how to construct or preserve 
affordable housing in cooperation with those most affected by 
condemnation—low-income communities and residents—who are 
increasingly at risk in the post-Kelo era.  This Article flips the eminent 
domain paradigm and addresses a link that Dana does not discuss in his 
proposal; that is, the parallels between inclusionary zoning and 
inclusionary eminent domain.  Here, this Article offers a variety of 
alternative methods to fix the exclusionary eminent domain 
phenomenon where courts are reluctant to decide takings challenges 
based on the amount of affordable housing lost from condemnation.  By 
reframing the eminent domain conversation from a normative doctrinal 
analysis to a normative conceptual analysis, the role of affordable 
housing becomes a centerpiece rather than an afterthought in economic 
redevelopment projects. 
Part II conceptualizes the eminent domain paradigm proposed in this 
Article by analogizing inclusionary zoning to inclusionary eminent 
domain.  This Part first revisits the history, usefulness and limitations of 
inclusionary zoning as a court-ordered remedy to halt exclusionary 
zoning, which originated from the Mt. Laurel saga in New Jersey.9  
New Jersey courts found that municipalities had violated state 
constitutional law by setting zoning requirements in areas to levels that 
excluded and segregated low-income affordable housing in remote and 
inopportune areas only accessible to the poor.  In response to the 
phenomenon of exclusionary zoning, affordable housing became a 
centerpiece of zoning laws.  Courts mandated that municipalities 
provide a realistic opportunity for a fair share of affordable housing for 
low- and moderate-income residents that would be needed immediately 
and in the future.  In further response to the mandates, inclusionary 
zoning programs were enacted by state legislatures to fix the 
 
7. Id. at 28–30. 
8. Id. at 52. 
9. See infra note 39 and accompanying text. 
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exclusionary zoning problem by employing land use control tools such 
as builder’s remedies, set-aside programs, density bonuses and in-lieu 
fees to achieve a fair share construction of affordable housing for low- 
and moderate-income households.10 
Analogous to inclusionary zoning, inclusionary eminent domain is a 
framework to think about how to fix the exclusionary eminent domain 
phenomenon and remedy condemnations that threaten the loss of 
affordable housing.  This section of Part II unpacks this new eminent 
domain paradigm by explicating elements that embody the concept—
inclusionary housing, meaningful engagement, community 
participation, collective action and public approval—and then 
explaining why each element helps redefine the meaning of “public 
use” as that which is deeply ingrained in the community.  While the 
tools of inclusionary zoning sought to remedy the exclusion and 
segregation of low- to moderate-income residents by exclusionary 
zoning policies, the tools of inclusionary eminent domain seek to 
remedy low-income and middle-income residents affected by 
exclusionary eminent domain.  This inclusionary model is equipped 
with a toolkit that conceptually and practically embodies each element. 
Part III explains in detail the kit of land assembly and land 
negotiation tools that give effect to the concept of inclusionary eminent 
domain.  In other words, this toolkit of CBAs, LADs, CDCs, CLTs, 
LABs and NIDs guides municipalities, private developers and 
communities on how to engage in inclusionary, not exclusionary, land 
assembly using eminent domain.  Indeed, the “bundle of tools” 
proposed here mitigates and tempers some of the exclusionary effects 
caused by the proverbial “bundle of sticks.”  The purpose of the tools is 
to reach the goals set forth in an economic redevelopment project 
without completely compromising the interests of one, or a few, 
stakeholders.  Here, the tools are slightly adjusted from their original 
purposes to adequately draw a parallel with the purpose of the land use 
control tools of inclusionary zoning; that is, to construct or preserve 
affordable housing.  This Article calls for developers, municipalities and 
communities to rethink how to plan for inclusion. 
I. LAND USE CONTROLS, LAND ASSEMBLY & EXCLUSION 
Part I draws parallels between exclusionary zoning and exclusionary 
eminent domain by analogizing the exclusionary effects created by local 
zoning powers and government takings powers in the United States.  
 
10. See infra Part II.A (discussing the inclusionary zoning methods employed by state 
legislatures). 
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Eminent domain and zoning have overlapped as legal issues in what 
courts call regulatory takings11 when the exercise of zoning as a police 
power rises to the level that is deemed near the equivalent of physically 
divesting a person of his or her property.12  In Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. 
 
11. This refers to the Fifth Amendment prohibition that “nor shall private property be taken 
for public use, without just compensation.”  U.S. CONST. amend. V.  For a discussion on 
alternative perspectives of the Takings Clause, regulatory takings and just compensation, see 
Joseph L. Sax, Takings and the Police Power, 74 YALE L.J. 36, 64 (1964) (arguing that 
compensation can prevent government takings from leading to discriminatory outcomes); see also 
BRUCE ACKERMAN, PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE CONSTITUTION (1977) (examining takings and 
compensation through various philosophical and legal perspectives); FRED BOSSELMAN ET AL., 
THE TAKING ISSUE 238 (1973) (recognizing that regulations have an economic impact on people 
that need to be addressed); ROBERT C. ELLICKSON & VICKI L. BEEN, LAND USE CONTROLS: 
CASES AND MATERIALS 149 (2005) (discussing compensation as an internalization of regulatory 
costs); RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF EMINENT 
DOMAIN (1985) (examining the Takings Clause in light of the relationship between the individual 
and the state); WILLIAM A. FISCHEL, REGULATORY TAKINGS: LAW, ECONOMICS, AND POLITICS 
(1995) (seeking a middle ground between deferring to unfair regulations that burden property 
owners and imposing compensation for every infringement); John F. Hart, Colonial Land Use 
Law and Its Significance for Modern Takings Doctrine, 109 HARV. L. REV. 1252, 1256 (1996) 
(highlighting legislation that requires payment of compensation to landowners when the 
government reduces the market value of property by more than 20% by restricting the use of 
land); Frank I. Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical 
Foundations of “Just Compensation” Law, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1165 (1967) (recognizing that the 
attempt to formulate rules of decision for just compensation has yielded unsatisfying results); 
William Michael Treanor, The Original Understanding of the Takings Clause and the Political 
Process, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 782 (1995) (arguing for a new theory of the Takings Clause under 
which compensation is only required in cases where there has been singling out or where there 
has been discrimination against discrete and insular minorities). 
12. Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 548 (2005) (holding that a plaintiff cannot 
show a regulation is a taking by arguing that the regulation does not substantially advance a 
government interest); Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 632 (2001) (finding that a 
regulation prohibiting the construction of a beach club development on an owner’s land did not 
constitute a total taking because the land retained significant worth for the construction of a 
residence); Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 394–96 (1994) (concluding that requiring a 
petitioner to dedicate part of her land for city use in order to expand her store was an 
uncompensated taking); Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1018 (1992) (holding that 
barring a landowner from constructing habitable structures on his land after he purchased it can 
constitute a taking because it denies the landowner access to an economically viable use of his 
land); First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. Cnty. of L.A., 482 U.S. 304, 321 (1987) 
(holding that when a government’s actions constitute a temporary taking, the government must 
provide compensation for the period in which the taking was effective); Nollan v. Cal. Coastal 
Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825, 837 (1987) (finding that conditioning a permit to expand property on the 
landowner allowing a public easement on that property is a taking if the land-use regulation does 
not serve public purposes related to the permit requirement); Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan 
CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 441 (1982) (holding that a statute allowing a cable company to place 
permanent cable facilities on a landowner’s property is a taking because it constitutes a 
permanent physical occupation); Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 261–62 (1980) (finding 
that placing landowners’ property in a zone that forbids multiple family dwellings is not a taking 
because it substantially advances a legitimate government goal, does not prevent the best use of 
the landowners’ land and does not extinguish a fundamental attribute of ownership); Penn Cent. 
Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 136–37 (1978) (holding that designating 
landowners’ train station a historical landmark is not a taking because it does not interfere with 
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Mahon, Justice Holmes noted this issue stating, the “general rule at least 
is that while property may be regulated to a certain extent, if regulation 
goes too far it will be recognized as a taking.”13  Mahon has garnered 
significant controversy over whether the Court’s decision is a proper 
foundation for modern day regulatory takings.14  Courts today require 
an “essential nexus”15 and “rough proportionality” when the state 
approves a development based on its dedication for the public purpose 
(or public use).16  These are long-standing judicial positions on 
regulatory takings that view the use or abuse of a taking as exclusionary 
by definition.  Indeed, one viable claim against eminent domain takings 
for private development is under the Equal Protection Clause, however 
it is rarely applied and poses historical and theoretical problems.17  
Regardless, the operation of regulatory takings excludes owners of 
property—rightfully or not—and this fact is nothing new to the 
regulatory takings debate.  However, eminent domain and zoning have 
rarely, if ever, been analogized in the context of affordable housing. 
Scholars have argued at length the usefulness and limitations of 
inclusionary housing programs to remedy exclusionary zoning.18  In 
 
the land’s present use nor does it prevent the landowner from realizing a reasonable return on 
investment); Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 416 (1922) (holding that determining whether 
a regulation constitutes a taking is a question of degree); Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394, 
409–10 (1915) (concluding that forbidding a landowner from making bricks on his property does 
not constitute a taking). 
13. Mahon, 260 U.S. at 415; see also id. at 413 (“When [regulation] reaches a certain 
magnitude, in most if not in all cases there must be an exercise of eminent domain.”).  The 
Mahon opinion, however, explains that a regulation is a taking when it denies the landowner the 
ability to pursue all economically viable, beneficial, productive or feasible uses of his or her land.  
Id. at 415–16.  The regulation must also have significant impact on the landowner’s investment-
backed expectations and must substantially advance legitimate state interests.  Id. 
14. See Robert Brauneis, “The Foundation of Our ‘Regulatory Takings’ Jurisprudence”: The 
Myth and Meaning of Justice Holmes’s Opinion in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 106 YALE 
L.J. 613, 702 (1996) (arguing that Mahon has left courts with very little framework for deciding 
constitutional property rights cases); see also Frank Michelman, Takings, 1987, 88 COLUM. L. 
REV. 1600, 1625 (1988) (arguing some takings cases “are a manifestation of the difficulties faced 
by the Court in trying to keep faith with American constitutionalism’s aspiration to reconcile 
private property (or, more generally, limited government) with democracy”); William Michael 
Treanor, Jam for Justice Holmes: Reassessing the Significance of Mahon, 86 GEO. L.J. 813, 861 
(1998) (analyzing how Mahon became central to takings law). 
15. Nollan, 483 U.S. at 837. 
16. Dolan, 512 U.S. at 391. 
17. Nestor M. Davidson, The Problem of Equality in Takings, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 1, 5 (2008) 
(arguing Takings Clause emphasis on protecting property rights does not make it a remedy for 
finding discriminatory use). 
18. For a comprehensive discussion of inclusionary zoning, see ANTHONY DOWNS, OPENING 
UP THE SUBURBS: AN URBAN STRATEGY FOR AMERICA 219 (1973) (showing how the unjust 
aspects of urban development can be remedied); Lawrence Berger, Inclusionary Zoning Devices 
as Takings: The Legacy of the Mount Laurel Cases, 70 NEB. L. REV. 186 (1991) (examining 
whether the Mount Laurel decisions are examples of judicial overreach attempting to end 
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contrast to the heated debate over zoning, the argument for inclusionary 
housing schemes to remedy exclusion and displacement by eminent 
domain has rarely been suggested in academic literature, contemplated 
by the courts or considered by municipalities or state legislatures.  
Likewise, courts have rarely been pushed to consider the effects of 
eminent domain on the loss of affordable housing when deciding 
whether to grant municipalities the power and private developers the 
benefit of eminent domain.  In fact, the historic framework of eminent 
domain analysis by the courts has rarely, if ever, suggested normative 
content to the public use takings doctrine.  The Supreme Court, and 
many federal and state courts, have repeatedly followed the modern day 
takings doctrine laid by Berman and continued by Kelo, electing to 
defer takings challenges to the legislative process.   
A consideration of the history, usefulness and limitations of 
exclusionary zoning will help begin unpacking this new paradigm. 
A. Exclusionary Zoning 
1. Urban Sprawl and Exclusion 
In the 1950s, urban sprawl created low-density and land-consuming 
developments on the fringe of the inner cities and pushed land use 
outward into rural and undeveloped areas that were in relatively close 
proximity to a deteriorating inner city.19  The phenomenon left behind 
 
economic segregation in housing); Paul Davidoff & Linda Davidoff, Opening the Suburbs: 
Toward Inclusionary Land Use Controls, 22 SYRACUSE L. REV. 509 (1971) (arguing that the 
standard governing zoning and land use control should be one of inclusion); Charles E. Daye, 
Whither “Fair” Housing: Meditations on Wrong Paradigms, Ambivalent Answers, and a 
Legislative Proposal, 3 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 241 (2000) (identifying how to legislatively 
correct the inadequacies of suburban exclusion and inclusion policies); Robert C. Ellickson, The 
Irony of “Inclusionary” Zoning, 54 S. CAL. L. REV. 1167 (1981) (arguing that inclusionary 
zoning programs actually often increase general housing prices); Robert A. Johnston et al., 
Selling Zoning: Do Density Bonus Incentives for Moderate-Cost Housing Work?, 36 WASH. U. J. 
URB. & CONTEMP. L. 45 (1989) (analyzing the effectiveness of density bonuses and equivalent 
financial incentives to projects that provide affordable housing); David S. King, Inclusionary 
Zoning: Unfair Response to the Need for Low Cost Housing, 4 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 597 (1982) 
(reviewing the judicial and legislative approaches to resolving the affordable housing problem); 
Thomas Kleven, Inclusionary Ordinances: Policy and Legal Issues in Requiring Private 
Developers to Build Low Cost Housing, 21 UCLA L. REV. 1432 (1974) (examining the impact of 
inclusionary ordinances on meeting housing needs); Laura M. Padilla, Reflections on 
Inclusionary Housing and a Renewed Look at Its Viability, 23 HOFSTRA L. REV. 539 (1995) 
(concluding that most inclusionary housing programs are viable and legally valid); Benjamin 
Powell & Edward Stringham, “The Economics of Inclusionary Zoning Reclaimed”: How 
Effective Are Price Controls?, 33 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 471 (2005) (determining that the economic 
defense of inclusionary zoning is flawed). 
19. Timothy J. Dowling, Reflections on Urban Sprawl, Smart Growth, and the Fifth 
Amendment, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 873, 874 (2000). 
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abandoned or underutilized property, contributing to the decline of 
many American inner cities.20  The scattering of suburban-bound 
middle-class families also required significant development of new real 
estate and services, which helped perpetuate white flight.21  The 
outward migration caused an inner-city exodus of working class 
families to the suburbs, seeking refuge from the deteriorating “ghetto 
underclass” conditions.22 
In response to the migration of low-income inner-city populations to 
the suburbs, zoning laws were manipulated by local governments to 
segregate and concentrate people within a locality—a practice called 
exclusionary zoning.23  As land was acquired and redeveloped in the 
suburbs, local officials and zoning boards made decisions to regulate 
and control the land density in accordance with desired local health, 
safety and welfare standards.24  The discriminatory nature of local 
zoning codes veiled by these standards was difficult to detect in 
constitutional challenges to a municipality’s zoning code. 
In Ambler Realty Co. v. Village of Euclid, the district court found 
such land divisions, under the veil of comprehensive zoning, 
unconstitutional because the land divisions classified and segregated the 
population based on income.25  The land divisions in Village of Euclid 
became better known as Euclidean zoning.26  The Euclidian technique 
divided land into separate zones, essentially segregating the land by use 
and building type.27  The land could be zoned for purposes of single-
family or multi-family residential housing, commercial property or light 
 
20. Marc Seitles, The Perpetuation of Residential Racial Segregation in America: Historical 
Discrimination, Modern Forms of Exclusion, and Inclusionary Remedies, 14 J. LAND USE & 
ENVTL. L. 89, 101 (1998). 
21. Id. at 91. 
22. See generally WILLIAM JULIUS WILSON, THE TRULY DISADVANTAGED: THE INNER CITY, 
THE UNDERCLASS AND PUBLIC POLICY (1987) (analyzing the effects of the exodus of working 
class families from the inner city and the causes of social dislocation). 
23. See Seitles, supra note 20, at 95–97. 
24. Id. at 96. 
25. Ambler Realty Co. v. Vill. of Euclid, 297 F.307, 316 (N.D. Ohio 1924), rev’d, 272 U.S. 
365 (1926).  Judge Westenhaver peeled away the discriminatory veil, exposing the unfair 
exclusionary nature of zoning saying: 
The plain truth is that the true object of the ordinance in question is to place all the 
property in an undeveloped area of 16 square miles in a strait-jacket. . . . [T]he result to 
be accomplished is to classify the population and segregate them according to their 
income or situation in life. 
Id. 
26. See Vill. of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co. (Euclid II), 272 U.S. at 387–89 (overturning the 
district court decision, finding that nothing in the zoning code was arbitrary or capricious). 
27. See Nicole Stelle Garnett, Ordering (and Order in) the City, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1, 4 (2004) 
(discussing how Euclidean zoning reflects the preference for single-use zones). 
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industrial.28  The local government’s exclusionary zoning code raised 
the price and sale of residential property in a particular area to levels 
that ensured that access to such property was denied to members along 
social, economic and racial lines.29 
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court was the other court to hear the 
early exclusionary zoning challenges.  In National Land and Investment 
Co. v. Easttown Township, the court found that zoning ordinances that 
were designed purposely to exclude were unacceptable and in violation 
of the state constitution.30  The court, only five years later, again took 
up the same issue.  In In re Concord Township, the court held that 
minimum lot sizes of two acres and three acres in the interior of a 
proposed 140-acre development were unnecessarily large, particularly 
for the construction of a house.31  Thus, public regulation of the lot sizes 
was found both unnecessary and “completely unreasonable.”32  Once 
other courts began deciding cases on exclusionary zoning, such 
practices became all but facially discriminatory.33 
Indeed, the expansive land reach of zoning in suburbs ultimately 
inflated the price of housing and segregated low-income residents—
 
28. Id. at 22.  See generally Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 541 (2005) (holding 
a Euclid zoning ordinance will “survive a substantive due process challenge so long as it was not 
‘clearly arbitrary and unreasonable, having no substantial relation to the public health, safety, 
morals, or general welfare’” (emphasis in original) (citation omitted)). 
29. See Sager, supra note 2, at 767 (discussing how exclusionary zoning results in the denial 
of residential access to members of low-income groups).  See generally STEPHEN R. SEIDEL, 
HOUSING COSTS & GOVERNMENT 159–86 (1978) (discussing the history, goals and impacts of 
zoning); David E. Dowall, The Effect of Land Use and Environmental Regulations on Housing 
Costs, 8 POL’Y STUD. J. 277 (1979) (analyzing the effects of land use and environmental 
regulations on housing costs). 
30. Nat’l Land & Inv. Co. v. Bd. of Adjustment of Easttown Twp., 215 A.2d 597, 612–13 (Pa. 
1965).  The court went on to hold that “[z]oning provisions may not be used, however, to avoid 
the increased responsibilities and economic burdens which time and natural growth invariably 
bring.”  Id. at 610. 
31. In re Concord Twp., 268 A.2d 765, 767 (Pa. 1970). 
32. Id. at 767. 
33. See, e.g., United States v. City of Black Jack, 508 F.2d 1179, 1186 (8th Cir. 1974), cert. 
denied, 422 U.S. 1042 (1975) (finding that a city ordinance prohibiting the construction of any 
new multiple family housing was a prima facie violation of the Fair Housing Act of 1968 because 
of its racial implications); Ybarra v. Town of Los Altos Hills, 503 F.2d 250, 254 (9th Cir. 1974) 
(recognizing that a large-lot zoning ordinance prevented Mexican-American appellants from 
living in the town because of their poverty); Oakwood at Madison, Inc. v. Twp. of Madison, 371 
A.2d 1192, 1208 (N.J. 1977) (holding that zoning ordinances under which persons in the bottom 
third of the population had no access to housing are impermissible); Surrick v. Zoning Hearing 
Bd., 476 382 A.2d 105, 111–12 (Pa. 1977) (finding that a zoning ordinance allowing only 1.14% 
of land for the development of multi-family dwellings was impermissible); In re Girsh, 263 A.2d 
395, 400 (Pa. 1970) (holding that a zoning ordinance, although it did not prohibit all apartments, 
was not permissible because it set aside too small of an area for apartments for the size of the 
population). 
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many of whom were people of color—by socio-economic 
characteristics.34  The resulting property tax rates differed between 
wealthier and poorer residential areas because the zoning codes tied 
multi-family housing prices to single-family housing prices,35 therefore 
implicitly segregating the tax base of the municipality into separated 
parcels of land.  Redlining was already one form of segregation that 
prevented certain groups from migrating and living in predominantly 
white neighborhoods.36  Euclidian zoning would later help perpetuate 
suburban sprawl and exacerbate segregation in America. 
2. Exclusionary Zoning Doctrine 
However, unlike Pennsylvania, some state courts, such as those in 
New Jersey, took a more progressive approach to zoning standards that 
veiled discriminatory actions.  The result was an increase in 
constitutional challenges to exclusionary zoning under the Equal 
Protection Clause, and not the Takings Clause, that forced courts to look 
narrowly at a zoning code’s intended purposes, an approach called 
exclusionary zoning doctrine.  In the 1970s several courts in New Jersey 
found that “practically any significant kind of zoning” had inherent 
socio-economic characteristics.37  The Mt. Laurel saga38 unveiled 
 
34. See ROBERT ELLICKSON & A. TARLOCK, LAND-USE CONTROLS 795–859 (1981). 
35. Multifamily Housing Finance and Production: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Hous. & 
Cmty. Dev. of the H. Comm. on Banking, Fin. & Urban Affairs, 102d Cong. 36 (1992) (statement 
of William C. Perkins, Board of Directors, Federal Housing Finance Board) (noting that 
affordable housing stock declined from 8.6 million units in 1974 to six million units in 1989). 
36. See DOUGLASS S. MASSEY & NANCY A. DENTON, AMERICAN APARTHEID: SEGREGATION 
AND THE MAKING OF THE UNDERCLASS 10 (1993).  Massey and Denton challenge William Julius 
Wilson’s “black-out migration theory” by positing the theory of “hypersegregation,” the “well-
defined institutional practices, private behaviors, and public policies by which whites sought to 
contain growing urban black populations,” including redlining, among other tactics, that 
perpetuated the concentration of poor blacks in the inner city.  Id.  For later studies on this topic, 
see XAVIER DE SOUZA BRIGGS, THE GEOGRAPHY OF OPPORTUNITY: RACE AND HOUSING 
CHOICE IN METROPOLITAN AMERICA (2005); see also KARYN R. LACY, BLUE CHIP BLACK: 
RACE, CLASS AND STATUS IN THE NEW BLACK MIDDLE CLASS (2007) (focusing on the impact of 
differences in residential location on the construction of identity for middle-class African-
Americans).  See generally ROBERT J. SAMPSON, GREAT AMERICAN CITY: CHICAGO AND THE 
ENDURING NEIGHBORHOOD EFFECT 20–30 (2012) (theorizing that there is a social component to 
enduring neighborhood inequality in that people react to neighborhood difference). 
37. S. Burlington Cnty. NAACP v. Twp. of Mount Laurel (Mt. Laurel II), 456 A.2d 390, 449 
(N.J. 1983) (hearing and deciding six cases together concerning towns’ obligations under the 
Mount Laurel doctrine). 
38. The term “saga” is used to illuminate the length and importance of the case.  This is 
simply an author preference, which I have used elsewhere in other scholarship.  See Gerald S. 
Dickinson, Blue Moonlight Rising: Evictions, Alternative Accommodation and a Comparative 
Perspective on Affordable Housing Solutions in Johannesburg, 27 S. AFR. J. ON HUM. RTS. 466, 
473 (2011) [hereinafter Dickinson, Blue Moonlight Rising]; Gerald S. Dickinson, The Blue 
Moonlight Remedy: Formulating the Voucher Scheme into a New Emergency Housing Remedy in 
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exclusionary zoning codes that discriminated based on opaque and 
vague standards such as codes that sought to achieve the health, safety, 
morals or general welfare of the residents and were all held 
unconstitutional on equal protection grounds.39 
Exclusionary zoning doctrine, originating from the Mt. Laurel 
Doctrine,40 essentially provided that a local municipality’s fair share 
obligation is presumptive.  If the plaintiffs (usually low-income 
households) make a prima facie case of exclusion, the burden then shifts 
to the municipality to prove otherwise.41  The Mt. Laurel Doctrine also 
imposes an obligation on the municipality to plan for the inclusion of 
low-income rental units in cooperation with private developers.  
Similar constitutional challenges were employed, with less success, 
in other notable cases such as Berenson v. Town of New Castle42 and 
Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas.43 And finally, the U.S. Supreme Court 
met its Euclidian match in Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan 
Housing Development Corp.44  But in one of the lesser-quoted excerpts 
from the Mt. Laurel saga, the court, in one line, captured the essence of 
where affordable housing policy was heading, stating that “Courts do 
not build housing nor do municipalities.”45  Indeed, in an increasingly 
deregulated housing market in the aftermath of the public housing 
demise, states were seeking ways to build housing through the private 
 
South Africa, 130 S. AFR. L.J. 554, 561 (2013) [hereinafter Dickinson, The Blue Moonlight 
Remedy]. 
39. See S. Burlington Cnty. NAACP v. Twp. of Mount Laurel (Mt. Laurel I), 336 A.2d 713, 
727–28 (N.J. 1975). 
40. John M. Payne, Norman Williams, Exclusionary Zoning, and the Mount Laurel Doctrine: 
Making the Theory Fit the Facts, 20 VT. L. REV. 665 (1995). 
41. See Mt. Laurel I, 336 A.2d at 728 (stating that if “a facial showing of violation of 
substantive due process or equal protection under the state constitution has been made out [] the 
burden” then “shifts to the municipality to establish a valid basis for its action or non-action”). 
42. Berenson v. Town of New Castle, 341 N.E.2d 236, 241 (N.Y. 1975) (finding that the 
exclusion of multifamily housing under New Castle’s zoning law was unconstitutional and 
holding “[t]he primary goal of a zoning ordinance must be to provide for the development of a 
balanced, cohesive community”).  The town was required to change its zoning laws to provide a 
fair share of various housing types that were marked at affordable market rates.  Id. at 243. 
43. Vill. of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1, 2–3, 9 (1974) (approving town zoning 
ordinance barring all uses other than owner-occupied single family residences within the 
municipal borders). 
44. Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977).  The 
challenge sought to halt the effects of decreased access to low- and moderate-income affordable 
housing.  See id. at 270–71 n.21.  But, lacking sufficient proof of intent to discriminate in the 
city’s refusal to rezone for purposes of constructing more affordable housing, the Court denied 
the challenge to overturn the exclusionary ordinance.  Id. at 270.  The Court also reviewed the 
racial discrimination claim, affirming that a showing of disproportionate impacts on particular 
groups was insufficient to prove an equal protection violation.  Id. at 265–68. 
45. See Mt. Laurel I, 336 A.2d at 734. 
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market, particularly in response to exclusionary zoning.  
However, the abovementioned cases do not invoke the Holmesian 
idea that regulations, particularly zoning codes, that go too far must 
involve the exercise of eminent domain.  The loss of affordable 
housing—or exclusion of low-income housing in wealthier parts of a 
locality—was confined mostly to the exercise of zoning that violated 
the Equal Protection Clause.  Eminent domain, like zoning, does have 
the power to exclude under the veil of health, safety and morals, but 
exercised under the Fifth Amendment Takings Clause.  In fact, the 
history of takings has resulted in a similar ubiquitous land use problem.  
Nevertheless, the practice of exclusion in the eminent domain context 
is, primarily, exercised by forcefully taking and assembling the land, not 
opaquely regulating and controlling the land.  
B. Exclusionary Eminent Domain 
The phenomenon of “exclusionary eminent domain,” coined by 
David Dana, occurs when a taking leads to the loss of affordable 
housing and the displacement of residents from one neighborhood to 
another.46  More than just this, though, it is analogous to exclusionary 
zoning in that the condemnation that results excludes low-income 
households from an otherwise predominantly or entirely middle-class or 
wealthy neighborhood or locality.47  Dana notes that poor residents are 
doubly excluded in eminent domain proceedings: 
Exercises of what I am calling “exclusionary eminent domain” are 
doubly exclusive because the displaced residents are unable to afford 
new housing in the same neighborhood or locality as their now-
condemned, former homes. In exclusionary eminent domain, low-
incomes households are excluded not only from their homes but also 
from their home neighborhood or locality.48  
Exclusionary eminent domain occurs in two distinct contexts—
suburban and urban.49  In the suburban context, dwellings or structures 
occupied by low-income families may be condemned by the 
municipality for purposes of attracting new development, drawing in 
 
46. See Dana, supra note 5, at 8. 
47. See id.; see also Matthew J. Parlow, Unintended Consequences: Eminent Domain and 
Affordable Housing, 46 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 841, 856–57 (2006) (“[N]ot only do cities fail to 
use their eminent domain power to build more affordable housing units, but they often use their 
power to raze them . . . .  By taking such affordable housing units off the market by their exercise 
of eminent domain power, cities reduce the available housing stock for low-income residents as 
such units are usually replaced by new high-end commercial, residential, and mixed-use 
projects.”). 
48. Dana, supra note 5, at 8. 
49. Id. at 8–9. 
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residential and commercial property for the wealthy.50  In the urban 
context, a municipality of a large city condemns property in a gentrified 
area.51  The consequence in either context is displacement.  Low-
income residents are forced to relocate to poorer areas of the city (in the 
urban context) or to remote suburbs.52   
As a result of this exclusionary practice, residents (also known as the 
renters or condemnees in eminent domain proceedings) do not receive 
compensation for a peculiar, but not less important, loss under the 
law.53  In other words, the loss is the inability to remain in the 
neighborhood the condemnee was displaced from.54  Takings doctrine, 
according to Dana, underprices low-income housing and produces an 
inefficiently high level of condemnations of low-income households.55  
The condemnee, as a result, bears the social costs of displacement.  
Although Dana’s definition of the exclusionary eminent domain 
phenomenon is narrowed to the effects in gentrifying urban areas where 
low-income owners and low-income tenants reside in relatively wealthy 
to middle-class areas, the forthcoming discussion conceptualizes the 
phenomenon, historically and more broadly, to include any form of 
condemnation and eviction—whether for purposes of economic 
redevelopment, urban renewal, urban regeneration, etc.—that decreases 
the stock of and access to affordable housing in slums and other forms 
of concentrated poverty-stricken neighborhoods.   
1. Urban Redevelopment and Displacement 
The municipal power to exercise eminent domain has a history of 
displacing disproportionately poor populations.56  The exclusionary 
 
50. Id. at 8. 
51. See id. at 8–9. 
52. Id. at 9.  In some jurisdictions, however, tenants do receive just compensation when the 
landowner’s property is condemned.  Indeed, the tenant (also known as the lessee), not just the 
landowner (or lessor), in such jurisdictions receives compensation based on the rental value over 
the rent that is reserved.  In other words, the tenant’s projected loss from condemnation depends 
on whether the rental value of the leasehold exceeds that of the rent reserved through the lease 
term.  Thus, Dana’s analysis that “renters . . . have no meaningful property rights within our legal 
framework” is loose and tenuous.  Id. at 43. 
53. Id. at 11. 
54. Id. 
55. Id. 
56. Wendell E. Pritchett, The “Public Menace” of Blight: Urban Renewal and the Private 
Uses of Eminent Domain, 21 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 1 (2003).  Wendell Pritchett describes the 
exclusionary effects of eminent domain through urban renewal saying, 
[B]light was often used to describe the negative impact of certain residents on city 
neighborhoods . . . [and] used to justify the removal of blacks and other minorities 
from certain parts of the city.  By selecting racially changing neighborhoods as 
blighted areas and designating them for redevelopment, the urban renewal program 
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effects of eminent domain were perhaps most glaring in New York City.  
The “power broker” behind many of the urban renewal projects was 
Robert Moses, who singlehandedly dispossessed tens of thousands of 
poor people from their homes and businesses to make way for his grand 
visions of a renewed urban environment.57  Thus, Moses was able to 
build silos for the poor and residential housing for the wealthy.58   
Indeed, slums and blighted areas were the havens for most of the 
poor who were removed.  Ironically, Moses was creating “new slums as 
fast as [he was] clearing the old” contributing “to the ghettoization of 
the city, dividing up the city by color and income.”59  The new, 
substitute housing was usually not on the site where the urban renewal 
project was taking place, but rather in remote locations on the outskirts 
of the city.60  The housing was bleak and sterile, expressing 
“patronizing condescension.”61  The courts would later learn that the 
meaning and interpretation behind condemnation—or appropriation—
could be used to satisfy the means to destructive ends.62   
The Supreme Court, and subsequently other state and federal courts, 
 
enabled institutional and political elites to relocate minority populations and entrench 
racial segregation. 
Id. at 6. 
57. ROBERT A. CARO, THE POWER BROKER: ROBERT MOSES AND THE FALL OF NEW YORK 
19–20 (Alfred A. Knopf ed., 1974) (unpacking the magnitude of the effects of eminent domain on 
displacing thousands of people). 
58. Id. at 20. 
59. Id. 
60. Id. (“[T]here are available no accurate figures on the total number of people evicted from 
their homes for all Robert Moses public works, but the figure is almost certainly close to half a 
million . . . .  The dispossessed, barred from many areas of the city by their color and their 
poverty, had no place to go but into the already overcrowded slums . . . .”). 
61. Id. 
62. In the 1920s, the New York State legislature understood “appropriation” to mean the 
allocation of funds by the Legislature.  See id. at 174 (referring to Chapter 122 of the Laws of 
1924).  However, Moses had read a very different, hidden meaning of “appropriation” in the 
legislation.  Significantly, in the context of land acquisition, the traditional use of the state’s 
authority to “appropriate” land was only for vast forest lands.  Id.  The power of condemnation by 
“appropriation” of land had not, however, been used in urban or suburban contexts.  Moses 
discovered and re-interpreted an obscure law enacted by the New York legislature in 1884, 
transferring the meaning of appropriation from the mountain and forest context to the urban and 
suburban context.  In the act, “appropriation” read as empowering the state to “appropriate” forest 
lands and defined “appropriation” as a procedure in which a state official could take possession of 
the land by simply walking on it, leaving the possessor of land with only a glimmer of hope of 
compensation by applying to the condemnation commission.  Id.  Title I of the United States 
Housing Act of 1949 amplified the “appropriation” power and gave the state authority to exercise 
eminent domain by condemning land and giving it to developers to build and construct.  Title I 
therefore allowed for the condemnation of almost any urban land within a city, and its evicted 
residents became victims of demolished buildings, only for the land to be handed to public and 
private developers.  Id. at 777. 
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finally entered the conversation over the constitutionality of the power 
of eminent domain for urban renewal projects and economic 
redevelopment projects where the land was transferred from the state to 
a private entity and later, from a private entity to a private entity.  This 
issue came to a head in Berman v. Parker63—the seminal case laying 
the prevailing foundation of takings doctrine that interprets the words 
“public use” as coterminous with “public purpose” when exercised for 
purposes of blight removal or economic redevelopment.64   
In Berman, the District of Columbia Redevelopment Land Agency 
was given the power to undertake the redevelopment of blighted 
territory by way of prevention, reduction or elimination of slums or 
areas that produce slums.  Area B, located in southwest Washington, 
D.C. was a decaying and blighted area of residential housing.65  But the 
“mere fact that a community occupied the proposed site for 
redevelopment was not factored into the eminent domain 
proceedings.”66  The community was not a primary factor in choosing a 
method of renewal, such as whether to physically destroy the area, 
thereby dispersing the community, or rehabilitating and restoring the 
area.67  By displacing the residents in the slums, the eminent domain 
proceedings offered few alternative accommodations for the—albeit 
inferior—existing affordable housing.68   
Section 6(b) of the District of Columbia Redevelopment Act of 1945 
(“DCRA”) required a redevelopment project (granted through the use of 
eminent domain and approved by the municipality commissioner) to 
have a provision that considered “the amount or character or class of 
any low-rent housing.”69  The Court focused on section 2 of the 
DCRA.70  But, the municipality’s plans for economic redevelopment 
 
63. See Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 34 (1954) (examining redevelopment for public 
purposes). 
64. See id. (stating that if a community is to be healthy, it cannot revert to being a blighted 
area). 
65. Id. at 30. 
66. Keasha Broussard, Social Consequences of Eminent Domain: Urban Revitalization 
Against the Backdrop of the Takings Clause, 24 LAW & PSYCHOL. REV. 99, 105 (2000). 
67. Denis J. Brion, The Meaning of the City: Urban Redevelopment and the Loss of the 
Community, 25 IND. L. REV. 685, 702 (1991). 
68. However, to convince the Court that the taking was justified for economic redevelopment 
purposes, the municipality proposed construction of affordable housing for the poor.  See 
Berman, 348 U.S. at 30–31 (noting “[t]he plan for Area B . . . makes detailed provisions for types 
of dwelling units and provides that at least one-third of them are to be low-rent housing with a 
maximum rental of $17 per room per month”). 
69. District of Columbia Redevelopment Act of 1945, ch. 736, § 6(b), 60 Stat. 790, 794 
(1946). 
70. See Berman, 348 U.S. at 28 (focusing on the statutory language stating that “‘the 
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fell short of its original intent to substitute the existing blighted housing 
with new affordable housing developments.71  Instead, the development 
plans for Area B changed after the Supreme Court granted the 
municipality the authority to condemn and the planned affordable 
housing developments were never fully realized.72  Berman set the stage 
for nearly sixty years of takings doctrine precedent.   
Poletown Neighborhood Council v. Detroit, Hawaii Housing 
Authority v. Midkiff, and Kelo v. City of New London followed 
Berman’s public use definition as taking anything that is “broad and 
inclusive,” including any “object . . . within the authority of 
Congress.”73  The growing eminent domain jurisprudence essentially 
washed away the meaning of the public use limitation in the 
Constitution.  Kelo then sparked a lengthy debate amongst the public, 
jurists, policymakers and academics over what was meant by rendering 
economic redevelopment takings for public use.74   
 
conditions . . . are injurious to the public health, safety, morals, and welfare; and it is hereby 
declared to be the policy of the United States to protect and promote the welfare of the inhabitants 
of the seat of the Government by eliminating all such injurious conditions by employing all 
means necessary and appropriate for the purpose’” (emphasis added) (internal citation omitted)).  
The Court further noted section 3(r)’s definition of substandard housing conditions: “dwelling . . . 
or housing accommodation for human beings, which because of lack of sanitary facilities, 
ventilation, or light, or because of dilapidation, overcrowding, faulty interior arrangement, or any 
combination of these factors, is in the opinion of Commissioners detrimental to the safety, health, 
morals, or welfare of the inhabitants of the District of Columbia.”  Id. at 28 n.1 (emphasis added).  
The Court acknowledged that many residents would be affected by the redevelopment project.  
See id. at 30 (“The population of Area B amounted to 5,012 persons, of whom 97.5% were 
Negroes.”). 
71. Audrey G. McFarlane, The New Inner City: Class Transformation, Concentrated 
Affluence and the Obligations of the Police Power, 8 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1, 50 (2006) (“The 
Berman [C]ourt’s approval of the exercise of police power thus implicitly rested on the plan’s 
provision for socio-economic variety and inclusion, most importantly of the poor.  Ironically, the 
implementation of the urban renewal program did not look anything like what was presented to 
the Court.”). 
72. Id. at 51. 
73. Berman, 348 U.S. at 33; see Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 483 (2005) 
(stating that the Court’s “public use jurisprudence has wisely eschewed rigid formulas and 
intensive scrutiny in favor of affording legislatures broad latitude in determining what public 
needs justify the use of the takings power”); see also Haw. Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 
240–41 (1984) (holding that economic development qualified as public use under the federal and 
state constitutions and holding that courts will not stop a taking as long as the use of eminent 
domain is rationally related to some conceivable public purpose); Poletown Neighborhood 
Council v. Detroit, 304 N.W.2d 455, 459 (Mich. 1981) (determining that redevelopment was for 
economic development purposes—the public benefit—and valid as public use even if the only 
claimed public benefit was a bolstered economy). 
74. See, e.g., ROBERT G. DREHER & JOHN D. ECHEVERRIA, KELO’S UNANSWERED 
QUESTIONS: THE POLICY DEBATE OVER THE USE OF EMINENT DOMAIN FOR ECONOMIC 
DEVELOPMENT 1 (2006) (stating that the use of eminent domain for economic development raises 
concerns that government power may be used to benefit private interests). 
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However, noteworthy is County of Wayne v. Hathcock, where the 
Michigan Supreme Court reversed Poletown, holding that “generalized 
economic benefit” is not enough to justify condemnation.75  Hathcock 
was a reprieve for many still trying, one year later, to wrap their heads 
around the powerful exercise of state authority that Kelo seemed to 
exhibit.  While some argued that there was a legitimate public outcry 
over Kelo because middle-income homes were being displaced, the 
same reasoning for granting the municipality the power to exercise 
eminent domain in the District of Columbia sixty years earlier was the 
controlling doctrine used in Berman.  The difference, however, was 
Kelo was an attack on America’s middle class while Berman had an 
impact on poor minority communities and thus received far less media 
attention.  
The main thrust of the problem in the abovementioned cases was the 
extent to which the state could exercise eminent domain for public or 
private purposes.  However, courts have yet to rule on eminent domain 
challenges based on whether the taking would have an impact on 
affordable housing.  But perhaps the dissents from Justice Thomas and 
Justice O’Connor laid the groundwork for such reasoning.76   
Today, the exclusionary effects of eminent domain still resonate in 
high-density urban environments.  The ongoing Atlantic Yards 
redevelopment saga in Brooklyn, New York is perhaps the most recent 
example of the phenomenon of exclusionary eminent domain where 
low-income and middle-income residents are displaced in an 
increasingly gentrified dense urban area.77   
The Empire State Development Corporation (“ESDC”), a quasi-
governmental organization, sought to condemn property in Prospect 
Heights, which then allowed New York City to officially condemn the 
land as blighted and in need of redevelopment.  The area was subject to 
 
75. Cnty. of Wayne v. Hathcock, 684 N.W.2d 765, 786 (Mich. 2004). 
76. Justices Clarence Thomas and Sandra Day O’Connor focused their Kelo dissents on the 
impact that eminent domain has on low-income minority communities.  Justice Thomas noted, 
“[a]llowing the government to take property solely for public purposes is bad enough, but 
extending the concept of public purpose to encompass any economically beneficial goal 
guarantees that these losses will fall disproportionately on poor communities.”  See Kelo, 545 
U.S. at 521 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
77. It worth noting in the discussion of Atlantic Yards, including Goldstein v. N.Y. State 
Urban Development Corp. (Goldstein), 921 N.E.2d 164 (N.Y. 2009), that Daniel Goldstein was 
the final landowner to hold out before the eminent domain proceeding commenced and the 
property was confiscated for redevelopment.  Goldstein, however, was a relatively affluent 
professional who was displaced by the redevelopment project.  Thus, exclusionary eminent 
domain increasingly impacts low-income and middle-class residents. 
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gentrification for years78 before the courts of New York confronted the 
borough’s biggest redevelopment project.79  Low-income tenants 
argued they were the “hardest hit,” losing rent-stabilized apartments and 
other affordable housing that was not replaced.80  Furthermore, 
opponents charged that they would be excluded not only from their 
homes but also from their home neighborhoods or localities in 
Brooklyn.81  Thus, a challenge arose and the courts intervened.82  
In Goldstein v. New York State Urban Development Corp. 
(“Goldstein”),83 the Court of Appeals of New York upheld ESDC’s use 
of eminent domain to acquire land for the Atlantic Yards project in 
Brooklyn.  The court deferred the decision-making process of 
determining blight84 to ESDC.85 
 
78. Iver Peterson, Prospect Heights Beginning to Climb to Gentrification, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 
27, 1988; see also James E. Caldwell, President’s Testimony at the New York City Council 
Economic Development Committee Hearing, Brooklyn United for Innovative Local Development 
(BUILD) (May 4, 2004).  White flight from urban areas in the 40s, 50s and 60s was followed by 
disinvestment from the inner cities, such as Brooklyn.  The disinvestment deprived many in 
search of economic opportunities of prosperity and imprisoned many in the clutches of working 
class poverty and underclass entrapment.  Id. 
79. See PRATT INST. CTR. FOR CMTY. & ECON. DEV., SLAM DUNK OR AIRBALL? A 
PRELIMINARY ANALYSIS OF THE ATLANTIC YARDS PROJECT 1 (Mar. 2005) (explaining that, in 
2000, approximately 65% of the households in the area earned more than the median income for 
Brooklyn, compared to 45% in 1990); see also DEV. DON’T DESTROY BROOKLYN, RESPONSE TO 
THE ATLANTIC YARDS ARENA AND REDEVELOPMENT PROJECT BLIGHT STUDY CONTAINED 
WITHIN THE GENERAL PROJECT PLAN 4 (Sept. 26, 2006) (stating Brooklyn’s real estate market in 
2006 was drastically different than its real estate market in 1968). 
80. See generally Brief for Develop Don’t Destroy (Brooklyn), Inc. et al. as Amici Curiae 
Supporting Petitioners, Kelo, 545 U.S. 469 (No. 04-108). 
81. Id. 
82. See Goldstein v. Pataki, 516 F.3d 50, 53 (2d Cir. 2008) (upholding the district court’s 
dismissal of a complaint lodged by fifteen property owners whose homes and businesses were to 
be condemned by the Atlantic Yards project and the pending construction of affordable housing).  
The ESDC’s taking for public use was determined valid under the Fifth Amendment.  Id. at 59.  
The court said the Atlantic Yards project, which involved the redevelopment of blighted area, the 
creation of affordable housing, the creation of public open space and other mass-transit 
improvements, was rationally related to public use and that the ESDC, deputized by the 
legislature, could determine what was public use based on its study and analysis of the land in 
Prospect Heights.  Id. at 58–59; see also Dev. Don’t Destroy (Brooklyn) v. Urban Dev. Corp., 59 
A.D.3d 312, 333 (N.Y. App. Div. 2009) (ruling in favor of the ESDC’s environmental impact 
statement).  The courts were now relying on the environmental impact statements and blight 
studies to determine whether blight rose to a level that granted the ESDC the power to seize the 
land, exercise eminent domain and hand over the responsibility of redevelopment to Forest City 
Ratner Companies LLC (“FCR”), the private development company.  See Dev. Don’t Destroy, 59 
A.D.3d at 423 (deferring to the ESDC’s blight study to determine there was blight in the takings 
area). 
83. Goldstein, 921 N.E.2d 164 (N.Y. 2009). 
84. Conditions that rise to the level of blight usually include high crime, high unemployment 
rates, declining tax bases, dilapidated buildings and infrastructure, buildings that violate building 
codes and high vacancy rates for commercial, residential or office buildings.  These conditions 
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The language of article 1, section 7 of the New York Constitution is 
similar to the Fifth Amendment Takings Clause.  It requires both public 
use and just compensation for a state taking of private property.86  Like 
Berman, a “broad and inclusive” definition of what constitutes 
permissible public use or public purpose was adopted in New York.87  
Significantly, the taking of land for slum clearance purposes is 
constitutionally accepted and falls under the public use requirement.88  
Moreover, under article 18, section 6, takings for the purpose of slum 
clearance and economic redevelopment must provide low-income 
housing if the project is subsidized or funded in some capacity by the 
state.89 
Like Berman, the construction of affordable housing was a 
substantial justification for the Atlantic Yards redevelopment project.90  
 
and definitions vary by state. 
85. Id. at 171–72 (discussing standard for upholding a public benefit corporation’s finding of 
blight). 
86. N.Y. CONST. ANN. art. I, § 7.  The provision was enacted in 1821 and was amended over 
the years to allow condemnations for private roads (in 1846) and for swamp drainage systems (in 
1894).  Id. 
87. See, e.g., Bd. of Hudson River Regulating Dist. v. Fonda, Johnstown & Gloversville R.R. 
Co., 164 N.E. 541, 543 (N.Y. 1928) (rejecting a claim that a dam, claimed to be needed for flood 
control purposes, was actually intended to benefit private power producers; even if there was a 
profit motive, the public use was sufficient); Holmes Elec. Protective Co. v. Williams, 127 N.E. 
315, 320 (N.Y. 1920) (Andrews, J., concurring) (upholding taking for telegraph company). 
88. N.Y. CONST. art. XVIII, § 9.  Although the amendment expressly authorized the use of 
eminent domain for slum clearance purposes, it did not modify article I, section 7, suggesting that 
slum clearance, in some cases, might still be found to be a private use.  Murray v. La Guardia, 52 
N.E.2d 884, 887–88 (N.Y. 1943) (finding slum clearance a public use). 
89. N.Y. CONST. art. XVIII, § 6.  The critical state constitutional provision used throughout 
Goldstein was ultimately shelved when the petitioners failed to make a persuasive case under 
article XVIII, section 6.  The New York constitutional provision states that “[t]he occupancy of 
any such project shall be restricted to persons of low income as defined by law and preference 
shall be given to persons who live or shall have lived in such area or areas.”  Id.  Under the plain 
language interpretation any housing built as part of the Atlantic Yards project, which received 
some state loans or subsidies, would be reserved for low-income tenants.  See id. 
90. See Brief for Petitioners-Appellants at 68, Goldstein, 921 N.E.2d 164 (N.Y. 2009) (No. 
2009-0178) (arguing that applying the plain language of article XVIII, section 6 of the New York 
State Constitution to the Atlantic Yards project would not produce absurd results, nor would it 
place unwarranted burdens on the developer); see also Coal. for Responsible Planning v. Koch, 
535 N.Y.S.2d 513, 519 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1988) (allowing plans for construction of housing to 
proceed after applying New York Private Housing Law and determining that “low-income” group 
is not required to have particular lower monetary income level); Chelcy v. Buffalo Mun. Hous. 
Auth., 206 N.Y.S.2d 158, 161 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1960) (applying article XVIII, section 6 of the New 
York State Constitution to state-aided public housing development); Minkin v. City of N.Y., 198 
N.Y.S.2d 744, 749–50 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1960) (denying injunction to prevent taking—although the 
property to be taken would benefit “middle-income” group—because, pursuant to article XVIII, 
the legislature adopted a broad standard for income status); Davidson v. City of Elmira, 44 
N.Y.S.2d 302, 311–12 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1943) (dismissing action to enjoin public housing authority 
from engaging in a housing project).  But see Goldstein, 921 N.E.2d at 184 (determining that the 
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The petitioners, however, argued that the respondent’s proposed 
affordable housing was not actually “affordable” for low-income 
persons.91  Instead “the majority of the housing units in the economic 
redevelopment project [were] slated to be rented or sold at market 
rates.”92  The petitioners pointed to article 18, section 6, arguing that 
although the land use improvement project received state aid earmarked 
for affordable housing, the project did not comply with the state 
constitution,93 and the respondent’s Modified General Project Plan 
suggested that affordable housing could never be constructed at the 
site.94 
The court dismissed such claims, stating that the argument “does not 
capture the provision’s [(article 18, section 6)] intendment.”95  The 
court explained that slum clearance and the construction of affordable 
housing were “not under the article necessarily, or even ordinarily, to be 
pursued in tandem.”96  Instead, it held the constitutional provision, 
approved in the 1930s, was intended to deal with the growth of slums.97  
If a municipality exercised the power to condemn emerging slums, then 
it was required that affordable housing be constructed.98  The court 
concluded, “The sentence in essence assures that if housing is created in 
connection with a slum clearance project, and the project is aided by 
state loans or subsidies, the new housing will replace the low rent 
accommodations lost during the clearance.”99  The court’s reasoning 
follows Berman and Kelo, ensuring that municipalities are not 
constitutionally obligated to build affordable housing when exercising 
 
core purpose of the Atlantic Yards project was not to develop affordable housing but rather to 
rehabilitate substandard land through improvements, including the construction of a sports arena, 
publicly-accessible open space, and community facilities). 
91. Brief for Petitioners-Appellants, supra note 90, at 14. 
92. Goldstein, 921 N.E.2d at 174. 
93. Brief for Petitioners-Appellants, supra note 90, at 68. 
94. See Brief for Respondents-Appellees at 24, Goldstein, 921 N.E.2d 164 (No. 2009-0178) 
(noting the Blight Study documented the presence of conditions that purportedly made it highly 
unlikely that the blight would be removed without public action). 
95. Goldstein, 921 N.E.2d at 174.  Significantly, the court clarified the language of the 
constitutional provision, saying the section 6 clause, “assures that if housing is created in 
connection with a slum clearance project, and the project is aided by state loans or subsidies, the 
new housing will replace the low rent accommodations lost during the clearance.”  Id. at 175.  
The court concluded that although building affordable housing to replace lost housing is a worthy 
objective, it is not constitutionally required under article XVIII, saying that “to hold otherwise 
would in many cases arbitrarily tether land use improvement to the creation of low rent housing 
and, in so doing, encumber, in a manner plainly without the framers’ contemplation.”  Id. 
96. Id. at 174. 
97. Id. 
98. Id. at 174–75. 
99. Id. at 175 (emphasis added). 
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eminent domain.  What was left of the Atlantic Yards saga was a lesser 
publicized component—a history-making community benefits 
agreement that serves as the seminal tool for how inclusionary eminent 
domain operates conceptually and practically.100 
Even amidst longstanding case law and federal legislation,101 the 
 
100. See infra Parts II.B.1, III.A (discussing how the CBA from the Atlantic Yards project 
could serve as a model for community leverage under inclusionary eminent domain). 
101. Housing Act of 1949, ch. 338, 63 Stat. 413 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 
12 and 42 U.S.C.) (relating to the Urban Renewal Fund, which was terminated by 42 U.S.C. § 
5316 after Jan. 1 1975).  Federal legislation has attempted to combat the displacement of 
communities from condemnation.  Id.  The Housing Act of 1949 was enacted to provide 
temporary relocation payments for people displaced by federal urban renewal programs.  Id.  The 
Fair Compensation Act (“FCA”) was enacted to standardize relocation assistance legislation 
along with the Housing Act of 1949.  SELECT SUBCOMM. ON REAL PROP. ACQUISITION OF THE 
HOUSE COMM. ON PUB. WORKS, 88TH CONG., STUDY OF COMPENSATION AND ASSISTANCE FOR 
PERSON AFFECTED BY REAL PROPERTY AND ACQUISITION IN FEDERAL AND FEDERALLY 
ASSISTED PROGRAM 145–47 (Comm. Print 1965).  The Act sought to afford “persons affected by 
the acquisition of real property in . . . federally assisted programs . . . fair and equitable treatment 
on a basis as nearly uniform as practicable.”  Id. at 147.  In particular, two prominent pieces of 
federal legislation have sought to mitigate the displacement effects on low-income communities 
when eminent domain and other land use mechanisms are exercised—the Uniform Relocation 
Assistance Act (“URA”) and the Housing and Urban Development Act (“UDA”).  See Housing 
and Urban Development Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-117, 79 Stat. 451 (codified as amended in 
scattered sections of 12 and 42 U.S.C.); Uniform Relocation Assistance and Real Property 
Acquisition Policies Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-646, 84 Stat. 1894 (codified as amended at 42 
U.S.C. §§ 4601–4655); see also NAT’L. HOUS. & ECON. DEV. LAW PROJECT, Guide to Federal 
Housing Redevelopment and Planning Programs, in HANDBOOK ON HOUSING LAW ch. X, pts. 1–
13 (1970) (discussing relocation obligations imposed by URA on federally funded highway 
projects that cause displacement).  The URA specifically incorporated many of the goals of the 
Housing Act and FCA and was a remedy for the growing social problems in urban areas and to 
alleviate hardship for the poor.  See NAT’L. HOUS. & ECON. DEV. LAW PROJECT, supra, ch. X, 
pts. 1–13 (reporting that URA requires more than the Highway Relocation Assistance Act of 
1968 from federally assisted projects in terms of relocation planning for displacees).  The URA 
was meant to ensure adequate replacement housing to individuals displaced by federally funded 
activities.  See 42 U.S.C. § 4621 (2012) (“This subchapter establishes a uniform policy for the fair 
and equitable treatment of persons displaced as a direct result of programs or projects undertaken 
by a Federal agency or with Federal financial assistance.”).  Significantly, the Act targeted low-
income communities who were disproportionately affected by displacement and subsequently 
experience serious affordable housing shortages.  See H.R. DOC. NO. 91-34, pt. 2, at 82–83 (1968) 
(reporting that urban renewal programs between 1949 and 1968 actually resulted in a net deficit 
between the number of low-income housing units directly destroyed and the number built for the 
poor); see also 42 U.S.C. § 4625(c) (describing relocation assistance advisory measures, facilities 
and services).  The URA did so by providing moving expenses or fixed moving allowances to 
those forced to relocate.  See 42 U.S.C. § 4622.  A relocation program is also available that 
compensates the cost of displacement with comparable replacement dwelling, but a 
comprehensive plan for relocation is not required.  See Coleman A. Young, Recent Developments 
in Urban Development, 21 URB. L. ANN. 317, 368 (1981) (stating that under the URA any 
displacing agency must create a relocation assistance advisory program, but such assistance is in 
the form of assurances and not duties).  However, similar to the objective analysis of just 
compensation used by the Supreme Court in takings cases, the URA provides the displaced 
person relocation to a dwelling of equivalent fair market rate.  See 42 U.S.C. § 4623 (authorizing 
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problem of displacement prevails.  The most recent proposal to treat the 
takings problem is a doctrinal remedy. 
2. Exclusionary Eminent Domain Doctrine 
Dana proposes a doctrinal remedy known as “exclusionary eminent 
domain doctrine” to fix the exclusionary phenomenon.  To unpack and 
analogize the doctrine, Dana ties together the similar negative effects 
that exclusionary zoning and exclusionary eminent domain impose on 
low-income communities. 
The doctrine is twofold.  First, it is a judicial evaluation of a 
municipality’s action in light of the regional need for low-income 
housing.102  Second, the doctrine considers the impact the taking has on 
a fair share obligation of affordable housing with respect to those needs 
and develops a rebuttable presumption of illegality when a municipality 
condemns land in an urban setting that decreases the stock of affordable 
housing below or further below its fair share obligation.103  The 
doctrine would not necessarily force the internalization of all real costs 
of exclusionary condemnations in the community.104 
The doctrine, like the exclusionary zoning doctrine, would instead 
apply heightened review to condemnations of low-income housing in a 
locality or neighborhood that has less than its fair share of affordable 
housing than a rational basis review would require.105  The heightened 
 
payments to displacees for the difference between the acquisition cost and the reasonable cost of a 
comparable replacement dwelling).  The UDA also sought to quell the problem of displacement.  
See 12 U.S.C. § 1715(z) (2012) (authorizing periodic assistance to lower income families for 
homeownership or membership in cooperative associations); 42 U.S.C. § 1455 (setting forth 
requirements to ensure displacees are relocated to decent, safe and sanitary dwellings).  The UDA 
was enacted in an effort to provide affordable housing for low-income families.  The Senate 
report emphasized that there ought to be a new strategy for providing housing and giving 
American families the widest choice in selecting the type of housing in which they desire to live.  
S. REP. NO. 1123-90, at 4 (1968).  Originally, the Act sought to achieve a balance in existing 
programs, placing emphasis on developing programs that would give lower-income families a 
better opportunity of becoming homeowners.  Id.  That goal was expanded to affordable housing 
broadly, not simply homeownership.  Id.  The UDA sought to improve conditions in the inner city 
areas where private investment is scarce, such as low-income communities.  Id. at 88.  With the 
increase of economic redevelopment projects throughout the nation, amendments to the Act can 
potentially redirect funds, at a minimum, to where private investment is already taking place to 
ensure inclusionary affordable housing because many of the economic redevelopment projects are 
already heavily funded by the private developer. 
102. See Dana, supra note 5, at 10 (evaluating a locality’s actions in terms of the regional 
need for low-income housing). 
103. Id. 
104. Id. at 11. 
105. Id. at 10.  Dana distinguishes zoning by invoking three principles that have dominated 
judge-made, non-statutory zoning.  These principles have been the overriding guide that cause 
judges to refrain from imposing limits on exclusionary zoning.  Id. at 23–25.  Dana’s 
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review standard would operate like a “reasonably-flexible rebuttable 
presumption that exclusionary government actions are illegal,” rather 
than like a traditional strict scrutiny standard.106  The municipality 
could rebut the presumption by showing an important, local need for the 
economic redevelopment project.107  However, the doctrine would not 
bar the condemnation of low-income housing in a neighborhood totally, 
but would require an application of heightened review to eminent 
domain proceedings and condemnations.108  Municipalities that seek to 
condemn land and exercise eminent domain would have to provide a 
more compelling justification for the taking rather than relying on 
rational review.109 
However, under this proposal, a court would have to engage in this 
heightened review in the absence of judicial precedent to guide its 
reasoning as to whether a fair share of housing is decreased by the 
taking.110  The only closely related precedent would be land use 
controls and exclusionary zoning doctrine.  But the practice of 
exclusionary zoning occurs, for the most part, in low-density suburban 
localities where neighborhood and locality boundaries are easily drawn, 
whereas exclusionary eminent domain doctrine would seek to mitigate 
the effect of displacement in dense urban areas where neighborhood 
boundaries are more difficult to draw.111  This makes determining 
whether the condemnee has actually been displaced from his or her 
neighborhood difficult for courts.  But the adoption of eminent domain 
doctrine would presumably result in properties not being acquired 
 
exclusionary eminent domain proposals focus on the third principle which gives local officials the 
authority to zone on behalf of the local welfare of only those living within a municipality.  Id. at 
24.  However, courts, particularly in New Jersey, New York and Pennsylvania, have departed 
from this third principle and require local officials to consider extra-local welfare where the 
zoning law has exclusionary effects on low-income residents and affordable housing.  Id. at 26–
27. 
106. Id. at 30–31. 
107. Id. at 31. 
108. Id.  The Nollan and Dolan nexus/rough proportionality test for judicial review of land 
use exactions is a similar heightened review application.  See Nicole Garnett, The Public-Use 
Question as a Takings Problem, 71 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 934, 936–37 (2003) (arguing generally 
that public use review should be modeled after Nollan/Dolan heightened review). 
109. See David A. Dana, Land Use Regulation in an Age of Heightened Scrutiny, 75 N.C. L. 
REV. 1243, 1294–97 (1997) (discussing likely responses of regulators and developers to the 
prospect of nexus/rough proportionality review in the repeat-game context compared to the one-
time context). 
110. Id.  In the exclusionary zoning context, courts in New Jersey, New York and 
Pennsylvania developed heightened review of exclusionary practices.  See Dana, supra note 5, at 
26–27. 
111. See id. at 29–30 (discussing how exclusionary eminent domain raises the question of how 
to define an urban neighborhood in a different way than exclusionary zoning). 
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when, and if, the municipality or private developer is unwilling to pay 
the full value of the property to the property owners and tenants.112 
Under exclusionary eminent domain doctrine, if a municipality did 
not substitute the low-income housing that is condemned for the public 
purpose of economic redevelopment, then the taking is unlawful and the 
government may not exercise eminent domain.113  Municipalities must 
provide substitute housing to overcome the loss of low-income housing 
under this doctrine.  This type of rebuttable presumption allows courts 
to decide cases based, in part, on cost-benefit balancing.  The courts can 
weigh the costs of the exclusionary impact versus the benefits 
associated with the exclusionary practice.114 
Indeed, Dana is right that there is something problematic with the 
exclusionary practice of eminent domain and something must be done 
to avoid displacing low-income residents and decreasing access to 
affordable housing.  Practicing lawyers are also beginning to see the 
parallels between exclusionary zoning and exclusionary eminent 
domain.115  Most important to this Article is that Dana’s proposal takes 
into account the social cost of losing affordable housing: 
[T]he possibility that a doctrine of exclusionary eminent domain will 
raise the effective cost of excluding a low-income household beyond 
the full social costs of exclusion is mitigated by the fact that the 
doctrine allows the locality and developer to avoid the doctrinal limits 
by constructing substitute affordable housing.116 
Empowering developers to “avoid the doctrinal limits by constructing 
substitute affordable housing”117 deserves further exploration in what is, 
otherwise, a convincingly argued doctrinal proposal.  Dana eloquently 
tells us what is wrong (exclusionary eminent domain) and tells us why 
we need a remedy (exclusionary eminent domain doctrine).  But how do 
we do this?  To avoid a judicial limitation by substituting more 
affordable housing where it was lost begs the question of how to 
 
112. See id. at 42 (noting that if the municipality or developer values acquisition of the site at 
less than the owner subjectively does, the owner will not sell and the site will not be acquired). 
113. See id. at 45 n.87 (noting that under the federal relocation statute displaced tenants and 
homeowners are entitled to a “comparable replacement dwelling”). 
114. See id. at 31 (positing that a doctrine limiting exclusionary eminent domain may be 
efficient, in a cost-internalization sense). 
115. Brief of Amicus Curiae Public Advocate of New Jersey at 39, LBK Assocs., LLC v. 
Borough of Lodi, No. A-001829-05T2, 2007 WL 2089275 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. July 24, 
2007) (“[I]f this principle, [exclusionary zoning,] prohibits municipalities from using zoning to 
prevent low- and moderate-income families from locating in their communities, a fortiori it 
forbids the use of eminent domain [(exclusionary eminent domain)] to expel low- and moderate-
income families already living within their communities.”). 
116. See Dana, supra note 5, at 52. 
117. Id. 
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constructively substitute the affordable housing while keeping in mind 
the interests of those most affected by the condemnation—low-income 
communities. 
Exclusionary eminent domain doctrine falls short of showing us how 
to constructively substitute or construct affordable housing where 
existing housing is to be lost by condemnation.  Moreover, Dana missed 
an important link that provides a useful analogy to answer the question 
of how to construct or preserve affordable housing and to fix the 
exclusionary eminent domain problem.118  One only has to look at 
inclusionary zoning—a legislative remedy imposed as a response to 
exclusionary zoning doctrine—to begin unpacking the answer to these 
ubiquitous land assembly questions.  Analogizing the eminent domain 
paradigm similarly to the zoning paradigm leads us to a new way of 
thinking about how to plan for inclusion in economic redevelopment 
projects. 
II. CONCEPTUALIZING A NEW EMINENT DOMAIN PARADIGM 
Part II discusses the policy behind inclusionary zoning that gives 
effect to the court rulings on exclusionary zoning.  Further, the tools 
used to achieve affordable housing, which include the builder’s remedy, 
set-aside programs, density bonuses and in-lieu fees, are explicated 
from the policy to show how similar tools in the eminent domain 
context could be replicated to assist localities construct or preserve low-
income affordable housing within dense urban areas where economic 
redevelopment is flourishing throughout the United States. 
A. Inclusionary Zoning 
Inclusionary zoning is broadly defined as any method within the law 
that creates more affordable housing in a community.119  This can 
 
118. Dana seemingly glosses over an important aspect of the Atlantic Yards private 
development and goes no further than to note that a community benefits agreement was one way 
to include, or substitute, affordable housing developments.  See id. at 12 (noting that the Atlantic 
Yards development “does include a community benefits agreement that provides that some 
affordable housing will be constructed in or near the redeveloped area as substitutes for lost 
affordable housing”).  However, Dana was far too focused on his doctrinal proposal as a remedy 
to fix the exclusionary eminent domain phenomenon, saying “the existence of a clearly 
recognized exclusionary eminent domain doctrine under New York state constitutional law might 
have resulted in a more generous and definite commitment for the creation of new affordable 
housing, and would allow for a more effective court enforcement mechanism.”  Id. at 5.  But, as 
demonstrated above in the Goldstein matter, 921 N.E.2d 164, 174–75 (N.Y. 2009), an 
exclusionary eminent domain doctrinal argument is not persuasive under existing New York state 
legislation or under the New York Constitution.  Indeed, more than a doctrinal proposal is 
needed. 
119. See DANIEL R. MANDELKER, LAND USE LAW § 7.26, at 7-23 to -24 (5th ed. 2003) 
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include high-density apartments and reduced development standards, 
among other strategies discussed shortly.120  In Mt. Laurel II, the court 
held that every municipality must provide a realistic opportunity for 
decent housing for its poor—in other words, provide its fair share, 
expressed in terms of number of units needed immediately and in the 
future.121  Court-mandated inclusionary zoning ordinances122 were 
designed, implemented and enforced by the New Jersey legislature, and 
municipalities were ordered to undertake affirmative measures and 
assist development by obtaining state and federal aid.123  New York and 
Pennsylvania courts departed from the usual deference to local officials 
to zone on behalf of general welfare and instead deployed a loosely 
reasoned “fair share” obligation on the municipality to provide 
affordable housing.124  The Mt. Laurel saga, however, brought a new 
normative perspective on zoning by requiring municipalities to enforce 
land use controls on private developers or to induce the developers to 
 
(discussing zoning revisions necessary to encourage affordable housing development). 
120. Id. 
121. Mt. Laurel II, 456 A.2d 390 (N.J. 1983). 
122. See Florence Wagman Roisman, Opening the Suburbs to Racial Integration: Lessons for 
the 21st Century, 23 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 65, 70 (2001) (discussing the New Jersey courts’ 
restraints on economic segregation).  Inclusionary zoning ordinances have been implemented in 
Massachusetts where approximately 1000 affordable units through various kinds of “affordability 
zoning” have been made mandatory and have increased affordable housing.  See Philip B. Herr, 
Zoning for Affordability in Massachusetts: An Overview, in Inclusionary Zoning: Lessons 
Learned in Massachusetts, NHC AFFORDABLE HOUSING POL’Y REV. (Nat’l Hous. Conference, 
Washington, D.C.), Jan. 2002, at 3–4 (discussing various inclusionary zoning provisions in 
Massachusetts voluntarily adopted by municipalities).  Other communities with inclusionary 
ordinances include Boulder and Telluride, Colorado, and Fairfax County, Virginia.  See, e.g., 
COLO. REV. STAT. § 9-13-3 (2013), available at http://www.colocode. 
com/boulder2/chapter9-13.htm (requiring that 20% of a project’s units be affordable for all new 
residential developments (regardless of project size) and that inclusionary units remain affordable 
in perpetuity). 
123. See Mt. Laurel I, 336 A.2d 713, 725–28, 745 (N.J. 1975) (“Land use regulation is 
encompassed within the state’s police power . . . .  [I]t is required that, affirmatively, a zoning 
regulation, like any other police power enactment, must promote public health, safety, morals or 
the general welfare . . . .  [I]t is beyond dispute that proper provision for adequate housing of all 
categories of people is certainly an absolute essential in promotion of the general welfare required 
in all local land use regulation . . . [and] it has to follow that, broadly speaking, the presumptive 
obligation arises for each . . . municipality affirmatively to plan and provide, by its land use 
regulations, the reasonable opportunity for . . . low and moderate cost housing.”). 
124. See Dana, supra note 5, at 26–27 (comparing New York and Pennsylvania zoning 
decisions to those in New Jersey).  Heightened review in the exclusionary zoning context helped 
challengers and the courts identify municipalities’ unconstitutional zoning practices.  Most states 
have settled with some form of heightened review of such issues but rarely go as far as to 
mandate the municipality implement a fair share of affordable housing.  That obligation, for the 
most part, is left for the legislature to enact.  It took a bold court and a unique set of facts and 
history in New Jersey to hand down such a state landmark judgment in Mt. Laurel, which is 
arguably an outlier on exclusionary zoning cases in the United States. 
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voluntarily increase the stock of affordable housing.125  The Mt. Laurel 
court, in its rationale for an exclusionary zoning doctrine, may have 
foreseen that the decision would push local municipalities and state 
legislatures to enact laws mandating inclusionary housing programs. 
In 1985, the New Jersey Legislature passed the Fair Housing Act and 
created the Council on Affordable Housing (“COAH”), which imposed 
regulations to provide affordable housing on municipalities. 
Municipalities were tasked with the obligation of using zoning powers 
in an affirmative manner to provide a realistic opportunity for the 
production of affordable housing for low-income families.  Since Mt. 
Laurel, there have been two primary routes to achieve this—mandatory 
and voluntary tools. 
1. The Tools of Inclusionary Zoning 
a. Builder’s Remedy 
The builder’s remedy is a voluntary tool used to affect land use and 
construct or preserve affordable housing developments.  The scheme 
grants builders the choice to profit from construction in ways that 
exclusionary zoning otherwise would not allow.126  Here, the private 
developer can challenge exclusionary decisions by a local zoning board 
on behalf of the public interest.127  In other words, the developer, who 
has been denied permits or variances to build affordable housing, can 
appeal the local zoning board’s decision.128 
This allows the developer to accelerate the process of constructing 
affordable housing using an administrative procedure instead of 
litigation.  The refusal to hold a hearing in response to the appeal 
automatically deems the permit granted.  However, if the developer 
 
125. However, few state courts have used state constitutional law to overturn exclusionary 
zoning laws.  Fewer courts have imposed set-aside zoning mandates on the ground that 
exclusionary zoning is excessive or discriminatory.  Truth be told, Mt. Laurel, to put it mildly, 
was a big success ideologically, but its practical effect remains quite limited.  Indeed, under 
current zoning doctrine, municipalities can overcome presumptions by showing local need.  In the 
exclusionary eminent domain context, a developer that avoids the doctrinal limitation operates 
similarly to the developer operating in the inclusionary zoning builder’s remedy context, where 
the developer can avoid the zoning law by constructing affordable housing and placing it on the 
market at or below the marginal cost of the unit. 
126. Andrew Dietderich, An Egalitarian’s Market: The Economics of Inclusionary Zoning 
Reclaimed, 24 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 28, 47 (1996). 
127. Id.  In Massachusetts, such a scheme was enacted under the Massachusetts Anti-Snob 
legislation, granting private developers the power to exercise the builder’s remedy.  See generally 
Paul K. Stockman, Anti-Snob Zoning in Massachusetts: Assessing One Attempt at Opening the 
Suburbs to Affordable Housing, 78 VA. L. REV. 535 (1992) (discussing the Anti-Snob 
legislation’s incentives to builders). 
128. See generally Stockman, supra note 127, at 550 (discussing the appeal process). 
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loses on appeal, the developer can obtain a review of the decision before 
a state committee.129  The committee reviews all aspects of the zoning 
code, the developer’s proposal for affordable housing and the regional 
needs for such housing.130  To overcome its burden, the zoning board 
must show health, safety, environmental, design, open space or other 
local concerns, all of which must clearly outweigh the regional need for 
affordable housing.131  Like with exclusionary zoning, there is a strong 
presumption against the locality unless it maintains a threshold level of 
affordable housing.132 
Underlying the builder’s remedy is the idea of filtering low-income 
housing from the decisions of private developers, not from government 
regulation or subsidization.133  The expected result of empowering 
developers to exercise the builder’s remedy is the development of 
affordable housing that would otherwise not be constructed at the 
market rate and to then filter down to those who would otherwise lack 
access.134  The problem, however, is that private developers may be 
unaware that constructing affordable housing, in and of itself, may not 
generate sufficient housing stock in the poorest areas where the income 
levels fall well below the market rate.135  Indeed, unless the locality is 
ready to subsidize low-income residents’ purchasing power, the 
developer may avoid using the builder’s remedy or the tool may be used 
only to construct middle-income housing.136  The latter process may 
benefit the poor only by filtering, which may be helpful for increasing 
accessibility to affordable, sometimes inferior, housing, but it is no 
substitute for the construction of new affordable housing 
developments.137 
Here, the geographic location of the housing under the builder’s 
remedy is important.  For private developers the location of the housing 
 
129. Id. at 551. 
130. See Dietderich, supra note 126, at 48 (discussing how the committee determines the 
denial of a variance or permit by looking at the regional housing needs). 
131. Id. 
132. Id. 
133. See generally Jane E. Larson, Free Markets Deep in the Heart of Texas, 84 GEO. L.J. 
179, 235–58 (1995) (rejecting theory that deregulation would produce sufficient, decent 
affordable housing and proposing policies that marry market and regulatory strategies to create 
such housing in settlements along the Mexico-Texas border). 
134. Id. 
135. See Dietderich, supra note 126, at 45–46 (discussing the expected change in affordable 
housing stock in low income areas based on whether a municipality implements mandatory or 
voluntary inclusionary zoning). 
136. Id. at 49. 
137. Id. 
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is of utmost importance in estimating the property’s value when and if 
sold in the future.138  If this is the case, then the filter effect may result 
in middle-income families capturing the housing rather than the lowest 
income brackets.139  This then begs the question of how affordable 
housing is defined under the inclusionary zoning laws and who it is 
intended to benefit.  If the filter effect fails, the government will have to 
intervene to subsidize affordable housing for the poor and the private 
developer’s use of the builder’s remedy goes to those who it was not 
intended to benefit.140  However, if the developer is willing to construct 
and place the affordable housing on the market at or below the marginal 
cost of a unit, then the developer can avoid the zoning law.141  Further, 
if the challenge to the zoning code is successful, the court will grant an 
order permitting the developer to construct the affordable housing 
development.142  However, compared to mandatory ordinances, 
voluntary programs like the builder’s remedy may be less likely to 
produce the same level of affordable units with a much broader and all-
inclusive range of household incomes through mandatory ordinances.143  
 
138. Id. at 51. 
139. See Ellickson, supra note 18, at 1186 (discussing the short-term advantages and long-
term disadvantages to moderate- and low- income families from the filtering effect). 
140. See Dietderich, supra note 126, at 49 (noting that the developers will either not use the 
builder’s remedy or the remedy will go to construct middle-income housing). 
141. Id. 
142. Rose, supra note 2, at 870–74; see also Mt. Laurel II, 456 A.2d 390, 452–53 (N.J. 1983) 
(noting that the builder’s remedy should be conditioned on the fact that the developer constructs 
sufficient low-income housing).  In Mt. Laurel I and II, critics were skeptical of the builder’s 
remedy as a tool to achieve inclusionary zoning because it was a voluntary scheme that required 
private developers to act in the public interest.  Critics contested that it resulted in little, if any, 
construction of affordable housing.  However, a builder’s remedy may also provide builders an 
avenue to provide affordable units and have the costs offset by the bonus of say, for example, 
25% or exemptions from other local ordinances.  In Mt. Laurel I, the trial court essentially 
allowed for the private developer to continue with an affordable housing development plan 
regardless of whether the municipality had granted the development permit, if the municipality 
failed to uphold its Mt. Laurel I doctrine obligations.  See Nolon, supra note 2, at 25–26 
(analyzing the three remedies employed in Mount Laurel II).  The result of the abovementioned is 
that the plaintiff-developer is awarded a rezoning for higher density, multi-family developments. 
143. See Nicholas J. Brunick, The Inclusionary Housing Debate: The Effectiveness of 
Mandatory Programs Over Voluntary Programs, ZONING PRAC., Sept. 2004, at 2–3 (citing 
several studies that found mandatory inclusionary housing programs generate a larger supply of 
affordable housing than voluntary programs); see also Dietderich, supra note 126, at 35 
(discussing how the Tiebout model disincentivizes affordable housing development by pushing 
costs onto developers and new residents).  Studies in California have found that fifteen of the 
most productive inclusionary housing programs are mandatory.  Some studies have found local 
ordinances produce a higher rate of affordable housing compared to voluntary inclusionary 
housing programs.  See Cal. Coal. for Rural Hous. & the Non-Profit Hous. Ass’n of N. Cal., 
Inclusionary Housing in California: 30 Years of Innovation, NHC AFFORDABLE HOUSING POL’Y 
REV. (Nat’l Hous. Conference, Washington, D.C.), Feb. 2004, at 13 (finding mandatory 
ordinances provide more affordable housing units for absolute numbers and percentage of total 
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Robert Ellickson contends that inclusionary zoning ordinances tacitly 
force the supply of affordable housing, resulting in a lack of affordable 
housing.144  He argues that ordinances that encourage builder’s 
remedies may slow the construction of affordable housing and increase 
income and race segregation.145 
b. Set-Aside Program 
Dietderich contends, however, that voluntary land use control tools, 
such as set-aside schemes, “will always increase the stock of affordable 
housing—measured either in market value or in number of units 
created.”146  This tool operates like a “conditional builder’s remedy” 
that takes advantage of the vast demand—assuming the demand is 
real—for forbidden suburban uses at market prices to finance the sale 
and resale of low-income housing units that fall below the actual cost to 
construct the units.147  Under this tool, the local zoning boards 
encourage or require the developer to set-aside a certain percentage of 
the units in a for-profit development for affordable housing.148 
The set-aside tool is optional and developers can choose to 
participate.  This scheme may increase the developer’s profits and the 
value of undeveloped land.149  However, if the benefits of constructing 
below-market units do not outweigh the costs associated with forgoing 
more profitable development elsewhere, then developers may be more 
likely to return to following localities’ exclusionary practices.  But 
Dietderich contends that the set-aside tool is more profitable for 
developers than the builder’s remedy because the latter only grants 
 
development than voluntary programs).  Moreover, the “voluntary programs do not cause market-
rate developers to build or facilitate affordable units unless including affordable housing makes 
an application more competitive in the permit approval process.”  Id.  In 1999, a mandatory 
inclusionary housing ordinance was adopted in Cambridge, Massachusetts.  By 2004, the 
program had produced 135 affordable homes with fifty-eight more anticipated for development.  
Brunick, supra at 3.  In the District of Columbia there were four mandatory county-wide 
programs to create affordable housing in mixed-income areas, such as Montgomery County, 
Maryland, where the county has constructed over 13,000 affordable housing units over thirty 
years.  Inclusionary programs have also been implemented in Fairfax County, Virginia, which has 
produced affordable homes for extremely low-income households by allowing the local housing 
authority to purchase some of the newly created affordable units.  New Jersey has also had 
success with inclusionary zoning ordinances that encourage the construction of affordable 
housing.  Nico Calavita, Inclusionary Zoning: The California Experience, NHC AFFORDABLE 
HOUSING POL’Y REV. (Nat’l Hous. Conference, Washington, D.C.), Feb. 2004, at 2. 
144. Ellickson, supra note 18, at 1215. 
145. Id. at 1170. 
146. Dietderich, supra note 126, at 45. 
147. Id. at 49. 
148. Id. 
149. Id. 
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developers relief from local zoning ordinances for proposals to build 
affordable—in other words, low-rent—housing.150  The former, on the 
contrary, provides the developer options, such as a variance, to 
construct any kind of affordable housing development with little, if any, 
limitation on profit maximization.151 
But Ellickson and other scholars contest the underlying assumptions 
of the set-aside tool.  The common argument is that developers may lose 
out on increased profits by being forced, or tacitly encouraged, to set 
aside a certain portion of the housing built for poor families under the 
assumption that the developer can still profit.152  Municipalities, 
Ellickson argues, ought to bear the burden by altering local housing 
policies instead of shifting the burden to the private sector.  Those in 
favor of a land use control tool steered by local agencies may have an 
inflated view of what can be expected of local regulators.153  This 
contention is most visible in mandatory inclusionary zoning tools. 
c. Density Bonus 
The density bonus tool compensates for the set-aside scheme.  The 
tool mandates that the developer dedicate certain portions of a new 
development for affordable housing units that exceed a certain size, 
height, floor plan or setback.  This bonus is meant to compensate the 
developer for anticipated losses.154  Simply put, the density bonus is 
“any increase in the feasible number of units (because of cost savings or 
otherwise) over the number of units that the jurisdiction [(locality)] 
would otherwise allow.”155  The bypass mechanism of the locality’s 
zoning code allows for the increase in the number of low-income units 
at rates that the poor—who would otherwise be unable to access—can 
lease.  Similar to the set-aside tool, the density bonus is malleable and is 
supposed to expand the supply of below-market housing to assure 
dispersal of affordable housing in developing areas within 
municipalities.156 
 
150. Id. at 49–50. 
151. Id. at 50. 
152. See id. at 26 (stating that inclusionary zoning is a revision of residential zoning rules to 
encourage profitable construction of affordable housing). 
153. See generally Robert Ellickson, Three Systems of Land Use-Control, 13 HARV. J.L. & 
PUB. POL’Y 67 (1990) (arguing that current zoning practice underestimates the competence of 
landowners and overestimates the competence of zoning officials). 
154. See Dietderich, supra note 126, at 45 (noting that a mandatory inclusionary program 
forces developers to dedicate some of its development to low-income housing but that the density 
bonus compensates for the possible losses). 
155. Id. at 67. 
156. Gregory M. Fox & Barbara R. Davis, Density Bonus Zoning to Provide Low and 
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The idea is that reducing exclusionary zoning requirements—lot-size, 
square footage, set-back distance, number of bedrooms, housing 
material, etc.—will result in significant cost savings.157  The tool 
requires municipalities to grant financial incentives for private 
developers to construct a certain percentage of affordable housing units 
in a locality that is planned to have five or more units, such as a density 
bonus of 25% or more.158  The developer is granted the bonus if 10% of 
the units are set-aside for low- to moderate-income families or 25% for 
moderate-income families.159  Density bonuses are also financial and 
political incentives because the tool requires no subsidies from local 
government and leaves the developer free work without much 
regulation or restriction.160  The outcome: a reasonable percentage of 
the original targeted housing development is made accessible to those 
who would otherwise not have the resources to live in the area. 
The density bonus tool also helps combat fixed pricing by forcing the 
supply of affordable housing to low-income residents who migrated 
from the inner city to the suburbs, where it is needed.  This is, in part, 
due to the economic nature of inclusionary zoning; that is, private 
developers desire to construct residential developments in strong 
housing markets and exact contributions from the development industry 
to produce affordable housing.161  While useful with regard to achieving 
a fair share of affordable housing, these mandatory programs may 
impose certain requirements that the developers would otherwise not 
freely choose themselves.162  Inclusionary zoning also helps preserve 
affordable housing and redevelop depreciating inner-city housing 
markets.163  This approach also concedes that inclusionary zoning 
ordinances work to construct affordable housing in strong housing 
 
Moderate Cost Housing, 3 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 1015, 1016 (1976). 
157. See Dietderich, supra note 126, at 67 (noting that retracting some exclusionary zoning 
requirements can reduce costs). 
158. Robert A. Johnston et al., Selling Zoning: Do Density Bonus Incentives for Moderate-
Cost Housing Work?, 36 WASH. U. J. URB. & CONTEMP. L. 45, 48 (1989). 
159. “Low-income” often means 80% or less of the county or city median income level, while 
“moderate-income” often means 80% to 120% of the county or city median income level.  Id. 
160. See Johnston, supra note 158, at 49.  Some density bonus programs, particularly in 
Montgomery County, Maryland, allow one bonus unit for every two affordable units.  See Fox, 
supra note 156, at 1046–48.  The result is affordable units that constitute only 5% of the 25,000 
residential units built over several years.  Id. at 1047.  The developer, operating under the density 
bonus scheme, is compensated for the decreased revenues from the below-market units.  Id. 
161. Douglas R. Porter, The Promise and Practice of Inclusionary Zoning, in GROWTH 
MANAGEMENT AND AFFORDABLE HOUSING: DO THEY CONFLICT? 214, 214 (Anthony Downs 
ed., 2004). 
162. Id. 
163. Id. 
DICKINSON.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 4/1/2014  10:44 PM 
2014] Inclusionary Eminent Domain 879 
markets that can absorb the costs involved with the regulations.  But 
higher costs always threaten to decrease the amount of development.164 
This means that local zoning boards control the resale price for many 
years after the properties have been built in order to encourage and 
sustain mixed-income housing that is inclusionary for moderate-income 
and low-income families.  Perhaps most fulfilling—for local officials 
and the taxpayers—is that the creation of affordable housing under 
inclusionary zoning ordinances, such as density bonuses, cuts costs on 
the public treasury.  Instead, private developers may bear the burden of 
forced subsidized housing for the poor themselves, undercutting their 
profit. 
Indeed, agency regulated zoning schemes are apt to stumble, 
according to some scholars, causing an inefficient misallocation of land, 
increased transaction costs as a result of undue administrative costs165 
and wasteful and arbitrary rent seeking.166  Ellickson argues that “[t]he 
irony of inclusionary zoning is . . . that, in the places where it has 
proven most likely to be adopted, its net effects are apt to be the 
opposite of the ones advertised,” causing a clogged housing market, 
higher rent prices, decreased property values and decreased supply of 
affordable housing, while failing to assist those who the scheme was 
intended to assist.167 
Ellickson, again, contends that municipalities should increase the 
production of housing priced beyond the reach of the poor in a filtering 
or a trickle-down scheme.168  Here, the assumption is that a housing 
 
164. In essence, both forms of housing—rental or homes—are sold below the market rate to 
accommodate and include those who otherwise would not have access to such property in an 
effort to achieve a fair share of affordable housing.  Controlling the resale of the rental property 
and homes in places where inclusionary ordinances are in place is similar to the local 
municipality’s authority to regulate and control land use. 
165. See generally Ronald Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960) 
(discussing the problems presented by externalities). 
166. See Ellickson, supra note 18, at 1175. 
167. See id. at 1216. 
168. Id. at 1185; see WILLIAM A. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMICS OF ZONING LAWS: A PROPERTY 
RIGHTS APPROACH TO AMERICAN LAND USE CONTROLS 327–29 (1985) (noting inclusionary 
zoning as a tool of wealthy suburban communities who want to halt growth); WILLIAM TUCKER, 
ZONING, RENT CONTROL AND AFFORDABLE HOUSING 11–14 (1991) (discussing inclusionary 
zoning and noting that it may lead to housing shortages and homelessness); Quintin Johnstone, 
Government Control of Urban Land Use: A Comparative Major Program Analysis, 39 N.Y.L. 
SCH. L. REV. 373, 392 (1994) (noting that inclusionary zoning may restrict supply of affordable 
homes); Jane E. Larson, Free Markets Deep in the Heart of Texas, 84 GEO. L.J. 179, 181 (1995) 
(noting that inclusionary zoning regulations inhibit the construction of affordable housing); Carol 
M. Rose, Property Rights, Regulatory Regimes and the New Taking Jurisprudence—An 
Evolutionary Approach, 57 TENN. L. REV. 577, 588 n.49 (1990) (noting that inclusionary zoning 
risks increasing the price of housing). 
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unit may filter downward in relative quality as its components 
depreciate, and therefore “the filler down process provides higher 
quality housing for the poor than can be provided by construction of 
new houses for them.”169 
Dietderich, on the contrary, takes the position that market forces 
operating under inclusionary zoning ordinances create more affordable 
housing than if the market forces are left to act alone.170  Inclusionary 
zoning ordinances, Dietderich argues, are likely to “expand the 
aggregate supply of housing available across income strata” and leave 
regional housing markets no less efficient.171  Therefore, the choice 
between the voluntary and mandatory inclusionary zoning tools, such as 
builder’s remedies, set-aside schemes or density bonuses, is dependent 
on how many affordable housing units a residential area needs.  Further, 
it depends on whether those who otherwise would not have afforded the 
units before the inclusionary scheme was in place, can actually afford to 
lease the higher-priced units and allow private developers to internalize 
subsidies for lower-priced units.172 
d. In-Lieu Fee 
In-lieu fees enable developers to opt-out of the obligation to construct 
affordable housing units by paying a fee in-lieu of building more and 
allocating the units for low-income renters.  The revenue from the fees 
is transferred to a government operated fund earmarked to finance 
inclusionary housing in the same neighborhood as the development or 
developments elsewhere in accordance with regional needs.173  In other 
cases, the fee revenues are allocated to a local housing authority to be 
used to provide affordable housing in the development.174  The 
developer can also opt not to pay the fee and avoid on-site inclusionary 
units if the developer provides an equivalent number of affordable 
housing units off-site.175  
In an era of post-Kelo takings, why restrict the use of a land assembly 
tool that holds the power to exercise a positive social function for 
affected communities with yet another doctrinal proposal that 
 
169. E. MILLS, URBAN ECONOMIC 123 (2d ed. 1980); see also JOHN WEICHER, HOUSING: 
FEDERAL POLICIES AND PROGRAMS 25–26 (1980) (finding “less low-quality housing in areas 
where there is a high rate of private new housing construction”). 
170. See Dietderich, supra note 126, at 28–29 (disagreeing with Ellickson). 
171. Id. at 28. 
172. See id. at 103 (concluding that where “a [great] transfer of neighborhood wealth is 
necessary to promote affordable housing, zoning rules should be mandatory”). 
173. See Ellickson, supra note 18, at 1183. 
174. Id. 
175. Id. 
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encourages more litigation and court intervention, when there may be an 
alternative framework, similar to the tools encouraged in inclusionary 
zoning?  Eminent domain has nothing in the way of court precedent to 
halt the loss of affordable housing and displacement from condemnation 
for economic redevelopment purposes.  Therefore, a new conceptual 
framework is necessary—namely “inclusionary eminent domain.”  
Inclusionary eminent domain shows us how to fix the exclusionary 
eminent domain problem, just as inclusionary zoning sought to fix the 
exclusionary zoning phenomenon. 
B. Inclusionary Eminent Domain 
1. The Concept 
In the inclusionary zoning context, the developer’s incentives include 
tax breaks, abatements, fee waivers and the ability to build more units, 
which help offset some of the losses the developer may incur from the 
inclusionary rules.  However, in the inclusionary eminent domain 
context—given the difference between regulating land versus 
assembling land—the incentive for developers, primarily, is public 
support and community cooperation, which sometimes is the key to a 
lucrative return on the condemnation of the land anticipated for 
development.  The Goldstein saga, and the subsequent agreement on 
affordable housing in the Atlantic Yards project through a CBA, is one 
example of motivating developers to engage in inclusionary eminent 
domain.  Further, in the zoning context, legislation—enacted in 
response to exclusionary zoning doctrine—was the remedy for 
excluding others from affordable housing options.  In the eminent 
domain context, legislation was also enacted in response to the modern 
day takings doctrine, which an appalled legislature found to be an 
expansion of municipal authority to condemn land. 
But, Dana’s doctrinal proposal seeks to reinvent the exclusionary 
zoning doctrine in the eminent domain context.  Although thoughtful, 
such proposals do not move us further through the takings muddle.  We 
need something more.  The practice of inclusionary eminent domain, in 
the absence of an exclusionary eminent domain doctrine, may “[result] 
in a more generous and definite commitment for the creation of new 
affordable housing” than Dana’s doctrinal remedy.176  The post-Kelo 
 
176. See Dana, supra note 5, at 12; see also DOUGLAS S. MASSEY ET AL., CLIMBING MOUNT 
LAUREL: THE STRUGGLE FOR AFFORDABLE HOUSING AND SOCIAL MOBILITY IN AN AMERICAN 
SUBURB 184–96 (2013) (showing the positive efficacy of affordable housing developments, such 
as the Ethel Lawrence Homes, an inclusionary affordable housing development constructed in 
response to Mt. Laurel’s exclusionary zoning code).  The scholar’s empirical findings validate the 
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takings doctrine,177 Dana’s new proposal, the current state legislative 
framework178 and the federal efforts in response to Kelo179 are all 
unlikely to fix the exclusionary problem.180  This new normative 
concept gives us a model to work from to help fix it. 
Inclusionary eminent domain is paradoxical in nature and is akin to 
inclusionary zoning.  In an effort to minimize the false positive effects 
of exclusionary eminent domain, inclusionary eminent domain plans for 
inclusion by constructing or preserving affordable housing where it is 
anticipated to be lost to condemnation.  The difference between 
inclusionary zoning and inclusionary eminent domain, therefore, is that 
the latter is not a result of heightened judicial review mandating 
affirmative legislative obligations on municipalities.  Nor is it a direct 
legislative proposal in the post-Kelo era, which restricts or bars 
municipalities’ power to condemn.  Instead, inclusionary eminent 
 
use of affordable housing projects as a tool to address exclusionary problems such as housing 
scarcity, poverty alleviation and residential segregation.  Id. 
177. However, the groundwork for a Kelo reversal was laid in the Hathcock ruling, which held 
that the government may not use eminent domain to take private property for more profitable 
purposes, such as economic redevelopment.  Wayne Cnty. v. Hathcock, 684 N.W.2d 765, 786–87 
(Mich. 2004). 
178. NEV. CONST. art. I, § 22, cl. 1 (forbidding transfer of any interest in property taken in 
condemnation proceeding from one private party to another private entity); ALASKA STAT. § 
09.55.240 (2013) (exempting preexisting public uses declared in state law from a ban on takings 
for economic redevelopment); COLO. REV. STAT. § 31-25-103(2) (2013) (defining blight); Id. § 
38-1-101 (allowing takings for eradication of blight); FLA. STAT. § 73.014 (2013) (banning blight 
condemnations and economic development takings, without mentioning that the state has 
substantially used the law for blight condemnations); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 26-501b (2013) 
(limiting blight condemnations to instances where property is “unsafe for occupation by humans 
under the building codes”); MO. REV. STAT. § 523.271 (2013) (exempting blight takings from the 
ban on economic development takings); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 18-2103, 18-2123, 76-710.04 (2013) 
(exempting “blight” condemnations from the ban on economic redevelopment takings); N.C. 
GEN. STAT. § 160A-503 (2013) (exempting blight condemnations from restrictions on takings for 
public purpose of economic redevelopment); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 163.021 (West 2013) 
(allowing eminent domain of blighted areas for public uses if certain conditions are met); TEX. 
CODE ANN. § 2206.001 (2013) (exempting “blight” condemnations from the ban on economic 
development takings); UTAH CODE ANN. § 17C-1-202 (West 2013) (revising the code to omit the 
power given in a previous version of the code to use eminent domain for blight alleviation or 
redevelopment); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1040 (2013) (prohibiting eminent domain except when 
it is for the purpose of “urban renewal”); W. VA. CODE § 16-18-3 (2013) (exempting blight 
condemnation from the ban on economic development takings and defining blight to include an 
area that “retards the provision of housing accommodations or constitutes an economic or social 
liability”).  Further, eleven state supreme courts have banned takings for the public purpose of 
economic redevelopment under state constitutions—Arkansas, Florida, Illinois, Kentucky, Maine, 
Michigan, Montana, Ohio, Oklahoma, South Carolina and Washington. 
179. H.R. 1433, 112th Cong. (2012). 
180. Ilya Somin, The Limits of Backlash: Assessing the Political Response to Kelo, 93 MINN. 
L. REV. 2100, 2120–30 (2009) (arguing that laws permitting blight condemnation after Kelo made 
banning or restricting condemnation for economic redevelopment nearly irrelevant). 
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domain is conceptualized as operating as an organic ex ante and ex post 
remedy with little, if any, imposition of the courts or legislation,181 
thereby—similar to Dana’s proposal—leaving the Kelo decision and the 
government’s power of eminent domain for economic redevelopment 
purposes intact.182 
This new model encourages a constructive, three-way engagement 
process and partnership among the community, private developer and 
municipality where condemnation is already, or anticipated, to be 
granted by the courts.  Inclusionary eminent domain shows us how 
private developers and municipalities can reconcile a development 
project in accordance with the needs and wants of the affected 
community.183  Eminent domain takings should temper and enable the 
human elements of economic redevelopment to flourish.  The following 
sections unpack the concept of inclusionary eminent domain. 
2. The Elements 
The elements that help fully conceptualize the meaning of 
inclusionary eminent domain include: inclusionary housing, meaningful 
engagement, community participation, collective action and public 
 
181. This Article does not go so far as to directly make a legislative analogy, such as imposing 
mandatory inclusionary eminent domain (like mandatory inclusionary zoning) as part of the land 
use approval process or a requirement before condemnation is granted by the courts.  That is part 
of this evolving new paradigm in takings law that will likely become a reality.  Given the barrage 
of post-Kelo legislation restricting or barring eminent domain at the state level, and even at the 
federal level, one could imagine a city council or state legislature experimenting with a proposal 
by amending local ordinances or state enabling laws to encourage or require “inclusionary 
eminent domain” provisions enabling agencies, governing bodies and land use approval boards to 
oversee the “meaningful engagement” process between the city, private developers and 
communities to determine which, if any, of the tools (CBAs, CDCs, LADs, CLTs, LABs and 
NIDs) would be utilized throughout the condemnation proceedings or during the redevelopment 
project for purposes of constructing or preserving affordable housing.  Indeed, some housing 
activists and grassroots organizations would find the proposal intriguing, although developers 
may find it unappealing. 
182. See Ilya Somin, Introduction to Symposium on Post-Kelo Reform, 17 SUP. CT. ECON. 
REV. 1, 4 (2009) (stating that Dana’s exclusionary eminent domain proposal does not seek to curb 
takings for economic redevelopment, but to curb “specific abuses arising from the exercise of 
eminent domain”). 
183. Although the concept of inclusionary eminent domain is presented in this Article as a 
functional guide for municipalities, private developers and communities, it is conceivable to 
expand its practical utility to broader partnerships and coalitions, such as federal and state 
governments in cooperation with local businesses, industries, labor organizations, along with 
private developers and affected communities.  Furthermore, the concept applies to development 
projects where middle-class and working class homeowners or renters prefer to move into other 
high-end neighborhoods or localities, but the property values stagnate or freeze at levels 
unattainable to those groups.  Indeed, many localities can benefit from middle-income and 
working-class populations migrating (or simply remaining situated) in the locality for, among 
other things, long-term growth, sustainability and development. 
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approval.  Each element is an important part of the practical and 
conceptual operation of the tools of inclusionary eminent domain.  A 
broader and perhaps more common theme that these elements embody, 
and that inclusionary eminent domain seeks to espouse, is the valuing of 
self-governance of common-pool resources (such as affordable housing) 
and the enabling of low-income communities to work effectively in 
cooperation with private developers and municipalities to manage the 
construction or preservation of housing while at the same time 
overcoming collective action problems.184 
Inclusionary housing: Affordable housing is the crux of the 
exclusionary eminent domain phenomenon.  Inclusionary housing seeks 
to ensure that a fair share percentage of affordable units are set aside 
and constructed within economic redevelopment projects where existing 
housing is planned to be condemned and razed for purposes of a larger 
project.  In the zoning context, inclusionary housing programs were 
imposed by state legislatures that required a fair share percentage of 
units to be developed in a building that was within a specific zoning 
area in order to meet the regional needs of affordable housing.  This 
ensures that affordable housing is dispersed within the economic 
redevelopment project and areas outlying the project area where those 
who must be displaced may move.  By constructing inclusionary 
housing in an economic redevelopment project, the effects of 
exclusionary eminent domain are mitigated and offset. 
Meaningful engagement: Elsewhere in the world, courts have looked 
to an evolving process known as meaningful engagement to resolve 
property and land use disputes where affordable housing and shelter is 
threatened.185  This process has not been widely published on or 
discussed in the American legal lexicon.186  The practice of inclusionary 
eminent domain must be linked to the idea of meaningful engagement 
where municipalities and private developers can reconcile their interests 
in order to encourage a process that prevents the exclusion of poor and 
low-income communities.187 
 
184. See Carol Rose, The Comedy of the Commons: Custom, Commerce, and Inherently 
Public Property, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 711, 742–49 (1986) (describing the historic development of 
managed commons). 
185. See generally Stuart Wilson, Planning for Inclusion in South Africa: The State’s Duty to 
Prevent Homelessness and the Potential of “Meaningful Engagement”, 22 URB. F. 265 (2011) 
(discussing South African law, which forbids evictions which lead to homelessness). 
186. Id. at 267. 
187. See id. at 272–74 (discussing the duty of municipalities in South Africa to engage with 
the property owners they seek to evict).  This idea of “meaningful engagement” derives from the 
South Africa urban regeneration context, where courts are continuously holding municipalities 
affirmatively responsible to uphold constitutional obligations to provide shelter for unlawful 
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Land use planning by municipalities and private developers in 
America has not been primarily focused on the social costs of utilizing 
land assembly tools, such as eminent domain, to achieve economic 
redevelopment or urban renewal.  Urban planning has, for the most part, 
followed a procedural process of adopting and complying with land use 
and land assembly regulations, building regulations and nuisance issues.  
Few state legislatures or courts—the outlier being New Jersey—have 
deigned to consider imposing affirmative duties on the municipality to 
take into consideration the social and human consequences of land use 
and land assembly.  Like Dana’s proposal,188 inclusionary eminent 
domain would encourage municipalities and private developers to 
internalize some of the social costs involved in the taking of land 
without the imposition of affirmative obligations from the courts or the 
legislature. 
Meaningful engagement in the American property and land use 
context would entail municipalities and private developers—in 
undertaking economic redevelopment—considering the potential 
consequences of the takings for the affected community and the 
measures that could be implemented before, during or after proceedings 
to alleviate those consequences.  Courts do not have the authority to 
deny a taking for economic redevelopment on the grounds of a loss of 
affordable housing, but they can ask the municipality and the private 
developer to engage with the community through various tools.189  The 
municipality and private developer ought to show that they made 
reasonable efforts190 to engage with the affected community on the 
proposed economic redevelopment project at various points throughout 
the economic redevelopment process.191  This may require courts in the 
 
occupiers evicted from private or public property where the eviction leads to homelessness and to 
engage in a process of meaningful engagement to lead the relocation process.  See Dickinson, 
Blue Moonlight Rising, supra note 38, at 470–73 (discussing the South African Constitutional 
foundations for meaningful engagement); see also Dickinson, The Blue Moonlight Remedy, supra 
note 38, at 566–72 (highlighting the housing problems caused by large-scale urban regeneration in 
Johannesburg and the impact that dramatic transformations in property rights, such as protections 
from eviction for those evicted from private property, may have on developers, municipalities and 
affected communities). 
188. See supra Part I.B.2 (discussing Dana’s proposal). 
189. See infra Part III (discussing the tools of inclusionary eminent domain). 
190. There are a variety of terms that have been used to establish a standard, including 
“reasonable efforts,” “reasonable best efforts,” “commercially reasonable efforts,” “diligent 
effort,” “every effort” and “good faith efforts.”  The standard used should be determined through 
the meaningful engagement process.  Indeed, certain terms will impose different levels of 
obligations that will either benefit the community or benefit the developer.  The meaningful 
engagement process amongst the parties, not the courts or the legislature, should decide that 
standard at the initial stages. 
191. This element of inclusionary eminent domain derives from the legal context in South 
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eminent domain context, like the zoning context in Mt. Laurel, to order 
that parties report back with detailed information prior to, during or 
after eminent domain proceedings about reasonable efforts to alleviate 
the problem of exclusionary eminent domain.  Meaningful engagement 
would evolve from another element of inclusionary eminent domain—
community participation. 
Community participation: The element of community participation 
focuses more narrowly on aspects of meaningful engagement.  It is 
commonly understood that limited-access and common-resource pools, 
such as affordable housing, flourish with strong mechanisms of self-
government that enable communities affected or threatened by 
condemnation to overcome collective action problems.192  Here, 
community participation is a layered approach for determining who 
represents the community in land assembly matters and how the 
community goes about organizing itself to prepare for negotiations with 
a private developer and municipality.  As William Fischel contends, 
having “voice” is the general ability to participate in and influence 
political processes—one that has certain protections from excessive 
regulation.193  Community participation and its subsequent voice is 
important because underlying much of the needs and wants of the 
community in eminent domain proceedings is who is speaking on behalf 
of the concerns and how the concerns are being conveyed, not only to 
the private developer and the municipality, but to the broader public as 
well. 
Community participation entails the affected community following a 
decision-making process that considers the viewpoints of all members 
and not a select few.  What is missing from Dana’s proposal is a 
discussion of the affected community’s interaction with the private 
developer and municipality to address the affordable housing problem.  
His proposal merely places the burden on the private developer to 
 
Africa discussed supra note 187.  However, the element of meaningful engagement in the 
inclusionary eminent domain context does not push for such affirmative duties because the 
American property law structure does not lend to imposing positive obligations on the state.  In 
some states, such as New York, courts have ignored the United States Supreme Court dogma that 
does not recognize a right to housing or other affirmative obligations and instead have allowed for 
loose language placing some affirmative obligations on the state to provide accommodation.  See 
N.Y. CONST. art. XVIII, § 1 (“[T]he legislature may provide in such manner, by such means and 
upon such terms and conditions as it may prescribe for low rent housing . . . accommodations for 
persons of low income as defined by law . . . .”). 
192. See Rose, supra note 184, at 749 (invoking the concept of self-management by orderly 
and civilized people). 
193. William A. Fischel, Lead Us Not into Penn Station: Takings, Historic Preservation, and 
Rent Control, 6 FORDHAM ENVTL. L. REV. 749, 751 (1995). 
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construct substitute housing without any concrete suggestions as to how 
to construct the housing in accordance with the needs and wants of the 
community.  In contrast, community participation encourages civil 
society organizations to help organize communities in developing a list 
of desired resources, particularly affordable housing, and a plan of 
action when facing condemnation and displacement.194 
Collective action: As Garret Hardin wrote in The Tragedy of the 
Commons, community participation helps to solve some of the 
collective action problems that arise in, for example, land assembly 
conflicts.195  Collective action in the eminent domain context arises 
where the possibility of losing affordable housing looms.  In other 
words, the disintegration of ownership or the prospect of losing 
ownership gives rise to multiple collective action problems, such as 
holdouts, free-riders and evasion.196  However, the community 
participation element assists in devising a structure to ensure members 
of the community have some power to accept or decline a proposed 
economic redevelopment project where eminent domain is exercised.  
From an ex ante perspective, structured participatory mechanisms, such 
as voting policies and community leadership positions, allow 
stakeholders to eliminate the abuse of eminent domain and surmount the 
community’s collective opposition against the project.  The elements of 
collective action and community participation play significant roles in 
how CBAs, CDCs, LADs and NIDs operate. 
Public approval: Perhaps one of the most important elements of 
inclusionary eminent domain—particularly in the aftermath of Kelo—is 
public approval of proposed condemnation for purposes of economic 
redevelopment.197  The public is less than enthused by the idea that the 
state has the power to take private property and transfer the property to 
another private entity in the name of “public use.”  When Pfizer folded 
its plan to relocate to New London after the Kelo decision, the public’s 
distaste for the use of eminent domain for public use soured even 
further.  The words “condemnation” and “eminent domain” arguably 
have negative connotations for both public officials and voters. 
 
194. Lawyers, as part of civil society organizations, can play a role in this as well.  See 
generally Sheila R. Foster & Brian Glick, Integrative Lawyering: Navigating the Political 
Economy of Urban Redevelopment, 95 CALIF. L. REV. 1999 (2007) (discussing the West Harlem 
Environmental Action campaign in West Harlem, New York and the decentralization of power in 
urban redevelopment and lawyers’ role in the process). 
195. Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCI. 1243 (1968). 
196. See Michael Heller & Rick Hills, Land Assembly Districts, 121 HARV. L. REV. 1465, 
1472–82 (2008) (discussing the problems of land assembly districts and eminent domain). 
197. Patrick McGeehan, Pfizer To Leave City That Won Land-Use Case, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 
13, 2009, at A1. 
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The practice of inclusionary eminent domain seeks to rethink the 
negative connotations and instead invoke an inviting terminology of 
“inclusion” that public officials, residents and developers can utilize in 
the planning process.  Elected officials obtain a better understanding of 
their constituencies’ desires by adhering to the public interest where 
eminent domain is proposed for development purposes. 
These abovementioned elements are found intertwined and 
interwoven within the social, economic and political fabric of the tools 
of inclusionary eminent domain.  The tools are the most important part 
of the successful practice and operation of this new land assembly 
model. 
III. THE TOOLS OF INCLUSIONARY EMINENT DOMAIN 
This Part offers a variety of land assembly tools that have been used 
in urban redevelopment projects and urban planning schemes 
throughout the United States.  The tools have historically been used for 
a variety of purposes, such as infrastructure, residential and commercial 
development and other land assemblage.  However, here the discussion 
and analysis of the tools are adjusted in accordance with the 
inclusionary eminent domain framework; that which is modeled for 
purposes of constructing or preserving affordable housing developments 
on land condemned for economic redevelopment.  Legislation in most 
states enables to some degree—but does not require or mandate—
communities, municipalities and private developers to utilize the 
following tools for economic redevelopment purposes.  While each tool, 
in and of itself, is capable of achieving the construction or preservation 
of affordable housing within economic redevelopment projects, the 
tools are also interrelated and overlap in operation. 
A. Community Benefits Agreement 
CBAs are private, legally binding contracts between private 
developers, municipalities and various community representatives 
setting forth a range of benefits to be included in a development project, 
which are the result of substantial community involvement.198  CBAs 
should promote the core values of inclusiveness and accountability.199  
They also help obtain the cooperation and participation of community 
organizations that might otherwise object to and stall the development 
project.  Community opposition, therefore, also has a causal effect on 
 
198. Julian Gross, Community Benefit Agreements: Definitions, Values, and Legal 
Enforceability, 17 J. AFFORDABLE HOUSING & COMMUNITY DEV. L. 36, 37 (2007). 
199. Id. at 37–39. 
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whether an economic redevelopment project receives regulatory 
approval through the land use approval process or public subsidies.200  
Further, opposition to a CBA poses a threat to the entire development 
project and securing other forms of funding.201  For developers, a 
promise of support is important because it helps the developer negotiate 
state subsidies and maintain good public relations.202 
For purposes of this Article, a CBA also concerns a single economic 
redevelopment project where eminent domain proceedings have 
commenced and the land has been condemned to begin construction.203  
Inclusiveness entails having a broad range of community concerns 
heard and addressed prior to a development project’s approval.204  To 
achieve inclusiveness, the CBA must have a broad coalition of 
organizations with demands that bring some weight to the negotiation 
table with municipalities and private developers.205  This aspect of 
meaningful engagement involves a community coalition with the 
strength to persuade a private developer to negotiate in the interests of 
the community.206  The prospect of a CBA also helps leverage demands 
at the negotiating table.  Private developers or municipalities may also 
propose a CBA.207 
Community coalitions hold the power to publicly support or oppose 
an economic redevelopment project.208  If support is given only upon 
conditions that are beneficial to the community, such as the developer 
agreeing to set aside a fair share of affordable housing in the economic 
redevelopment project, then a legally enforceable mechanism such as a 
 
200. Vicki Been, Community Benefits Agreements: A New Local Government Tool or Another 
Variation on the Exactions Theme?, 77 U. CHI. L. REV. 5, 7 (2010). 
201. Id. 
202. JULIAN GROSS, GREG LEROY & MADELINE JANIS-APARICIO, COMMUNITY BENEFIT 
AGREEMENTS: MAKING DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS ACCOUNTABLE 9–10 (2002). 
203. Julian Gross’s CBA definition excludes policies and documents setting forth required 
conditions for a range of projects, such as redevelopment plans, general plans, specific plans, 
zoning laws and other land use documents.  Moreover, Gross excludes benefits, such as 
“inclusionary housing policies” and ordinances or resolutions, that make procedural 
improvements in the approval processes.  Therefore, while Gross contends that zoning laws, 
ordinances and “inclusionary housing policies” should not be part of the CBA definition, I 
contend—for conceptualization purposes—that they ought to be a part of the CBA process.  See 
Gross, supra note 198, at 39 (noting that a CBA concerns a single development project, thereby 
excluding policies and documents outlining the requirements for groups of projects). 
204. Id. at 37–38. 
205. Id. at 38. 
206. Id. 
207. Been, supra note 200, at 7–8. 
208. See id. at 15–18 (explaining the ways in which a communities may assist the 
development process). 
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CBA may be the way to attain that support.209 
The CBA, under the inclusionary eminent domain framework, 
operates in a similar manner to the builder’s remedy by allowing the 
developer and the community to accelerate the process of constructing 
affordable housing using administrative procedures and legally binding 
negotiations instead of litigation.  Accountability, therefore, is also 
important in the CBA process.  Indeed, promises made by the 
redevelopment agency, the municipality and the private developer with 
regard to the community benefits should be a legally binding process 
and enforced against the parties.210  The CBA has been utilized to 
construct or preserve affordable housing in economic redevelopment 
projects successfully on the West Coast and has increasingly, albeit with 
less success, become an important tool for land assembly and affordable 
housing on the East Coast.211 
 
209. See Gross, supra note 198, at 38–39 (explaining that CBAs advance accountability). 
210. Id. 
211. CBAs first appeared on the West Coast, with California having the first in 1998.  The 
agreement was struck with the development of the Hollywood and Highland Center.  The 
development project included 4000 theater seats, several parking lots and hotels, 1.2 million 
square feet of retail space and was projected to cost $388 million.  The benefits package for the 
development project also included living wages and job training provisions along with affordable 
housing.  Shortly after the success of the Hollywood project came another CBA success with the 
construction of the Staples Center in Los Angeles.  See Patricia E. Salkin & Amy Lavine, 
Negotiating for Social Justice and the Promise of Community Benefits Agreements: Case Studies 
of Current and Developing Agreements, 17 J. AFFORDABLE HOUSING & COMMUNITY DEV. L. 
113, 116 (2008).  At the start of the Staples Center development project, the community residents 
were led astray after the developer failed to provide the promised benefits when the first phase of 
the project had been completed.  The negotiations involved the developer and the Figueroa 
Corridor Coalition for Economic Justice (“FCCEJ”).  The FCCEJ represented more than thirty 
community organizations.  Part of the planned project was to provide permanent affordable 
housing.  See STAPLES CENTER COMMUNITY BENEFITS AGREEMENT A-9 to -10 (June 20, 2011), 
available at http://www.scribd.com/doc/58303580/Staples-Center-Community-Benefits-Agree 
ment-CBA.  To ensure some oversight and enforcement, the CBA established a committee to 
monitor the agreement and to maintain dialogue between the developer and the coalition.  In fact, 
shortly thereafter the developer issued the funds for the construction of affordable housing.  See 
Salkin & Lavine, supra, at 117.  In San Diego, a strong coalition of twenty-seven housing, labor 
and environmental groups coalesced to create a CBA with the developer JMI/Lennar in the 
development of Ballpark Village.  Significantly, the CBA forced changes to the original project’s 
affordable housing plans, which had initially not included housing on site.  The CBA forced the 
developer to make the housing inclusionary.  See generally Ballpark Village Project CBA, 
CENTER ON POL’Y INITIATIVES, http://onlinecpi.org/campaigns/ballpark-village-cba/ (last visited 
Dec. 28, 2013) (noting that the community coalition pressured the developer to include more than 
the usual amount of affordable housing).  In Oakland, the Oak of 9th project had a CBA attached 
to it in 2006.  The project planned to construct 3000 residential units and a retail complex.  E. 
BAY ALLIANCE FOR A SUSTAINABLE ECON., BUILDING A BETTER BAY AREA: COMMUNITY 
BENEFIT TOOLS AND CASE STUDIES TO ACHIEVE RESPONSIBLE DEVELOPMENT 39–41 (2008); 
see also COOPERATION AGREEMENT (OAK TO NINTH PROJECT), available at 
http://urbanstrategies.org/programs/econopp/documents/FinalOaktoNinthCooperationAgreeement
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The Atlantic Yards redevelopment project in Brooklyn, New York is 
separate and distinct from other CBAs and development projects across 
the United States.  Recall Goldstein where the municipality exercised 
eminent domain to take property for the public purpose of economic 
redevelopment and struck a CBA with the community to ensure that the 
project plan had inclusionary housing.212  The Atlantic Yards CBA 
modeled the Staples Center CBA, which progressively negotiated a 
CBA that emphasized enforceability, accountability, transparency and 
 
withCoalitionfinalexecution.pdf (providing the terms of the 2006 CBA); OAK TO 9TH CMTY. 
BENEFITS COAL., MAKING A NEIGHBORHOOD FOR ALL OF OAKLAND: A COMMUNITY PROPOSAL 
FOR AFFORDABLE HOUSING AND JOBS IN THE OAK TO 9th DEVELOPMENT SITE 4 (2005), 
available at http://urbanstrategies.org/programs/econopp/documents/Oakto9thCommunity 
BenefitsCoalitionReport-July2005.pdf (introducing the Oak to 9th Development Project); Salkin 
& Lavine, supra, at 120 (providing a summary of the Oak to 9th CBA).  The agreement was 
entered into by a coalition of community members and the redevelopment agency and primarily 
focused on affordable housing.  Significantly, it authorized injunctive relief to be awarded to the 
community for noncompliance.  CBAs have also succeeded in the Midwest.  In 2005, 
Milwaukee’s Park East Redevelopment had a CBA attached to it.  One aspect of the CBA 
required the county to provide affordable housing.  See Salkin & Lavine, supra, at 126.  In New 
York, CBAs have faced considerable opposition and arguably less success than those on the West 
Coast.  In Kaur v. New York State Urban Development Corp. a victory for Columbia University 
seemed all but certain until the appellate court overturned the lower court’s ruling that had 
previously banned the state from exercising the power of eminent domain to take private property 
for the non-profit institution’s seventeen-acre expansion project in West Harlem and 
Manhattanville without the property owner’s consent.  In re Kaur v. N.Y. State Urban Dev. Corp., 
933 N.E.2d 721 (N.Y. 2010), rev’g 892 N.Y.S.2d 8 (App. Div. 2009).  The court held that the 
judiciary must defer to the state to determine whether a location is “blighted” and that 
condemnation on behalf of a university served a public purpose.  Id. at 733–35.  The provision of 
affordable housing was proposed by the University in a Memorandum of Understanding.  The 
University proposed a $20 million fund to develop or preserve affordable housing.  COLUMBIA 
UNIV., UNIV. SENATE, MANHATTANVILLE AND ACADEMIC AND PHYSICAL PLANNING AT 
COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY (2010).  The affordable housing was recognized in the Final 
Environmental Impact Statement (“FEIS”) to minimize the “significant adverse indirect 
residential displacement impacts” due to a projected “upward pressure on market-rate rents.”  See 
N.Y.C. DEP’T OF CITY PLANNING, MANHATTANVILLE: FINAL ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT 
STATEMENT 4-4, 25-1 (2007), available at http://www.nyc.gov/html/dcp/html/env_review/ 
manhattanville.shtml (follow the hyperlinks for the relevant chapters).  The applicants argued that 
the provision of affordable housing, among other provisions, cannot be considered “civic 
purposes” or “public purposes of the project.”  Columbia agreed to provide an affordable housing 
and legal services fund, subsidize the West Harlem Piers Park, fund the I.S. 195 playground, 
extend Columbia’s small business retail strategy, commit between 4 and 18% of retail space in 
the project site to local entrepreneurs, enact construction safety mitigation procedures, provide 
construction jobs for minorities, provide meeting space and offices for Community Board 9 and 
provide unspecified community access to Columbia’s proposed facilities.  The City 269 Planning 
Commission’s recommendation also refers to Columbia’s commitment to develop a mind, brain 
and behavior public outreach center.  See Brief for Petitioner at 52–53, In re Tuck-It-Away v. 
N.Y. State Urban Dev. Corp., 892 N.Y.S.2d 8 (App. Div. 2009) (No. 778), 2009 WL 7446916 
(arguing that the Columbia project is not a civic project). 
212. Goldstein, 13 N.Y.3d 511 (2009); see supra notes 82–101. 
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inclusiveness.213 
After the Goldstein decision, the State of New York had its first CBA 
in its history.  The agreement was the legally-binding force behind 
ensuring that low-income families and community members had a direct 
voice in the decision-making process and planning of affordable 
housing214 in the Atlantic Yards project.215  Prior CBAs around the 
United States were part of a larger development, but in those examples 
the municipality did not exercise eminent domain.  In contrast, the 
Atlantic Yards CBA was drafted in response to condemnation 
proceedings, thus making it a strong conceptual and practical example 
of inclusionary eminent domain. 
Forest City Ratner, the developer, promised to construct affordable 
housing within the Atlantic Yards redevelopment project to replace the 
housing stock projected to be lost from condemnation.216  The CBA 
was drafted with the support of eight community organizations and the 
developer.  The agreement was considered an “historic commitment to 
affordable housing.”217  The CBA also had the support from over 200 
community leaders.  The actual percentage has varied over the years.  A 
fair share percentage was proposed at 50% at the beginning stages of 
the project, but then decreased to 30% affordable housing.  The CBA 
relied upon “governmental contributions for site development and 
affordable housing subsidies.”218  The initial goal was for the 
ACORN/Atlantic Yards 50/50 Program to use the existing Housing 
Development Corporation’s bond program and the Department of 
 
213. See Salkin & Lavine, supra note 211, at 121–22 (analyzing the Atlantic Yards case 
study).  See generally Community Benefits Agreements, COMMUNITY BENEFITS L. CENTER, 
http://www.forworkingfamilies.org/cblc/cba (last visited Dec. 28, 2013). 
214. The CBA also included educational initiatives, jobs for minorities and women, as well as 
pre- and post-construction job training.  It contained environmental assurances and a commitment 
to develop community facilities, such as child-care and youth and senior centers, and it ensured 
community access to the arena for local events such as high school and college graduations and 
for religious congregations.  COMMUNITY BENEFITS AGREEMENT 11–13, 26–35 (2005), available 
at http://www.buildbrooklyn.org/pr/cba.pdf. 
215. Id. at 22. 
216. See Press Release, Mayor Michael R. Bloomberg, Forest City Ratner CEO and President 
Bruce Ratner and Civic Leaders Sign Community Benefits Agreement (June 27, 2005), available 
at http://www.nyc.gov/html/hpd/html/pr2005/mayors-release248-05-pr.shtml. 
217. Michael Freedman-Schnapp, A New Dynamic: Atlantic Yards Challenges Brooklyn 
Progressive Politics, NEXT AM. CITY, Jan. 1, 2006, at 11.  The signatories of the agreement 
included Faith in Action, the Association of Community Organizations for Reform Now 
(“ACORN”), Brooklyn United for Innovative Local Development (“BUILD”), Brooklyn Voices 
for Children, the Downtown Brooklyn Neighborhood Alliance (“DBNA”), the Brooklyn 
Endeavor Experience (“BEE”), the New York State Association of Minority Contractors 
(“NYSAMC”) and the Public Housing Communities (“PHC”).  Id. 
218. See COMMUNITY BENEFITS AGREEMENT, supra note 214, at 23, exhibit D, annex A. 
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Housing Preservation and Development programs to construct the 
housing.219  However, a battle has endured over the “promise” of 
affordable housing.220 
While fair share affordable housing—which the petitioners in 
Goldstein argued the state constitution required—failed on its merits, 
the private developer and the community agreed to construct a certain 
percentage of affordable units to replace lost affordable housing without 
the constraints of heightened judicial review which, under an 
exclusionary eminent domain doctrine, would have forced developers to 
substitute the lost affordable housing with new affordable housing.  
Instead, the CBA—without the imposition of courts or the legislature—
was the controlling factor that led to the agreement to construct 
affordable housing. 
However, accountability has been a problem.  One of the primary 
justifications for the taking of blighted property in Atlantic Yards—
affordable housing—has been scrutinized even though “it was 
reasonable to expect the benefits from the Community Benefits 
Agreement when it was signed.”221  The slow economy may have 
become an impediment, but it has been reported that FCR had indicated 
that plans for affordable housing appear to have been indefinitely 
delayed.222  It was well documented in the CBA that there was not a 
minimum threshold for affordable housing.223 
The definition of “affordable” in the CBA has been a highly 
 
219. See Been, supra note 200, at 26 n.97 (noting that the Atlantic Yards CBA promises to 
provide affordable housing but foresees that the housing will use various public subsidy 
programs); see also COMMUNITY BENEFITS AGREEMENT, supra note 214, at 23, exhibit D, annex 
A (stating that “the program may also utilize existing Housing Finance Agency (HFA), 
Affordable Housing Corporation (AHC) or Housing and Urban Development (HUD) programs, 
with necessary modifications”). 
220. See generally Bloomberg, supra note 216 (noting the challenges overcome in order to 
implement the CBA). 
221. Norman Oder, A (Somewhat Speculative) FAQ on the Atlantic Yards News, ATLANTIC 
YARDS REP. (Mar. 22, 2008), http://atlanticyardsreport.blogspot.com/2008/03/speculative-faq-on-
atlantic-yards-news.html.  See generally MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING 1–6 (2005).  A 
fifty-fifty affordable housing deal was made in a Memorandum of Understanding (“MOU”) 
between FCR and the ACORN and was then attached to the CBA, presumably providing some 
enforceability of affordable housing.  See Norman Oder, CBA “Watchdog” Sought to Ensure 
“History Making” Benefits “for Local Community,” ATLANTIC YARDS REP. (Mar. 19, 2007), 
http://atlanticyardsreport.blogspot.com/2007/03/cba-watchdog-sought-to-ensure-history.html  
(scrutinizing the Atlantic Yards CBA). 
222. Charles V. Bagli, Slow Economy Likely to Stall Atlantic Yards, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 21, 
2008, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/03/21/nyregion/21yards.html. 
223. See COMMUNITY BENEFITS AGREEMENT, supra note 214, at 22–26 (providing the 
requirements for housing); see also MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING, supra note 221, at 4 
(providing that 50% of the housing units on the project site constitute affordable housing). 
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contested aspect of the project.  The Atlantic Yards project used area 
median income (“AMI”) for the New York City metropolitan area to 
determine market-rate rental prices, rather than AMI in Brooklyn.224  
This calculation can conflate the definition of “affordable” housing with 
the threshold for what qualifies as “low income” in Brooklyn, 
particularly those whose annual incomes fall below the AMI.225  
Therefore, the housing stock produced may become above-market rate 
housing for the area, which would be far beyond the annual household 
income for many residents in Brooklyn. 
According to the EIS study, the “socioeconomic characteristics of the 
new population (e.g., in household income and household size) would 
not be markedly different from the characteristics of the population 
living in the broader ¾-mile study area.”226  With figures like these 
using AMI calculations, it is possible that the existing Brooklyn low-
income population may be priced out of newly developed units because 
the scale for affordability is higher than annual household incomes.227  
Some argue that even if 35% of the housing development is affordable, 
the overall increase in affordable housing would likely be less than a 
fair proportion of substitute housing.228 
Municipalities may need to require that the terms of the CBA be 
made part of the redevelopment project between the quasi-state entity 
and developer.229  However, CBAs are not authorized in all states and 
some states do not authorize municipalities to enter into the negotiations 
or agreements.230  In such cases the CBAs are only enforceable by the 
contracting community groups.231  This issue of state-by-state 
 
224. EMPIRE STATE DEV., ATLANTIC YARDS FINAL ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT 
S-5 (2006) [hereinafter FEIS], available at http://www.esd.ny.gov/Subsidiaries_Projects/AYP/ 
AtlanticYards/AdditionalResources/AYFEIS/00_Executive_Summary.pdf; id. at 4-50, available 
at http://www.esd.ny.gov/Subsidiaries_Projects/AYP/AtlanticYards/AdditionalResources/AYF 
EIS/04_Socio.pdf. 
225. Amy Lavine & Norman Oder, Urban Redevelopment Policy, Judicial Deference to 
Unaccountable Agencies, and Reality in Brooklyn’s Atlantic Yards Project, 42 URB. LAW. 287, 
320 (2010) (discussing the differences in AMI between Brooklyn and the metropolitan area). 
226. FEIS, supra note 224, at 4–57.  The study further said that the “shifts in the distribution 
of households across income brackets would be small and would not substantially affect the 
overall socioeconomic character of the study area.”  Id. 
227. See Lavine & Oder, supra note 225, at 320. 
228. See id. at 318–20 (explaining that the actual amount of affordable housing offered was 
about 35% of the project and that the use of a citywide AMI would actually result in the 
“affordable” housing being priced beyond what most current residents could afford). 
229. Been, supra note 200, at 34. 
230. See generally Michael H. Crew, Development Agreements after Nollan v. California 
Coastal Commission, 483 U.S. 825 (1987), 22 URB. LAW. 23, 27–31 (1990) (explaining 
development agreements and challenges that developers face in some states). 
231. See Gross, supra note 198, at 49–51 (discussing ways that public CBAs can be made 
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authorization creates murky waters for states like New York that have 
many large, ongoing economic redevelopment projects but do not have 
any statutory oversight to ensure the CBAs are successfully executed—
the only legally binding aspect of the CBA is the primary enforcement 
mechanism.  However, CBAs are only successful when they are 
enforceable.232 
It is important to note that municipalities in New York do not have 
authorization to enter into redevelopment agreements as part of a land 
development approval process.233  Some of the underlying issues that 
the Atlantic Yards CBA has experienced may in fact be linked to the 
fact that there is no statutory or legislative authority overseeing the 
CBA at the federal, state or local level.  Therefore, while the goal is for 
the CBA, along with the other tools, to operate as an organic remedy to 
construct or preserve inclusionary housing, there is also the case to be 
made that tools such as the CBA may need legislative or judicial 
oversight.234  Nonetheless, the CBA is a warranted addition to the 
inclusionary eminent domain toolbox. 
B. Land Assembly District 
LADs are another innovative local tool that fall under the framework 
of inclusionary eminent domain.  The purpose and function of LADs “is 
to unify property interests without expropriating property owners.”235  
In the midst of the eminent domain muddle and the courts’ slow 
response to untangling the complexities of takings for the public 
purpose of economic redevelopment, LADs have been proposed as an 
inclusive and community-driven tool to assemble land.236  The model 
 
enforceable through the use of community groups). 
232. See Salkin & Lavine, supra note 211, at 115 (“This reality[—that many CBAs are 
enforceable only by the contracting community groups—]raises a number of as yet untested legal 
issues, including who will have standing to challenge and enforce privately negotiated CBAs, and 
whether these voluntary agreements, regardless of their terms, will be enforceable in a court of 
law.”).  See generally Patricia E. Salkin & Amy Lavine, Understanding Community Benefits 
Agreements: Equitable Development, Social Justice and Other Considerations for Developers, 
Municipalities and Community Organizations, 26 UCLA J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 291, 324–28 
(2008) (addressing some of the legal issues related to enforcing CBAs). 
233. Salkin & Lavine, supra note 211, at 120–21. 
234. Lavine & Oder, supra note 225, at 289–90 (“The planning process, or lack thereof, raises 
serious concerns about the transparency . . . .  It is likely that a good deal of the conflict could 
have been reduced had FCR and ESDC pursued a more open and inclusive process from the 
outset, and had they been willing to fairly consider and incorporate public input in the 
development of the project’s plans.”). 
235. See Heller & Hills, supra note 196, at 1468. 
236. See id. at 1469–70  (rejecting the tragedy of the anticommons solution, that is, a call for 
the Leviathan where disinterested experts are employed by a larger-scale government who figure 
out what the parties would have done were they capable of contracting or self-government). 
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arises out of frustration with the two traditional methods of assembling 
land in the United States—voluntary assembly and eminent domain.  
Voluntary assembly leads to a holdout problem, resulting in 
underassembly, while eminent domain leads to a “fair market value” 
problem resulting in capricious redistribution with little regard for the 
subjective or emotional valuation of the property.237  Thus, LADs main 
purpose is “to overcome the landowners’ collective action problems that 
prevent them from selling their land for an efficient assembly.”238 
Heller and Hills propose giving back what they see as the 
communities’ share in the benefits of condemnation, not the burdens 
associated with the taking.239  LADs seek to solve some of the 
distributive injustice on low-income communities and property owners 
in general.240  As discussed earlier in this Article, assembling public 
land, particularly when it involves condemning and razing property for 
economic redevelopment, encounters hostility by low-income and even 
middle-class residents and homeowners. 
Thus, LADs give neighbors the freedom to decide, collectively, what 
for and how their land will be assembled when a municipality proposes 
the exercise of eminent domain.  This land assembly design, retrofitted 
for purposes of eminent domain, would give neighbors veto power to 
reject economic redevelopment projects that are not worth the time and 
costs.241  The LAD proposal also seeks to redesign property rights in a 
way that enhances both welfare and fairness in the wake of what Heller 
and Hills see as eminent domain’s unjust redistribution of land at the 
expense of landowners and residents.242 
The process of meaningful engagement under this regime requires 
that if the municipality or the private developer offers an unsatisfactory 
price for compensation to the LAD’s constituents, the assemblage of 
land would not move forward.243  Thus, meaningfully engaging and 
discussing plans with the affected community is essential.  Here, the 
controlling factor is the affected community’s response to the private 
developer’s intentions to develop.  This is in contrast to relying on 
heightened judicial review to solve the affordable housing problem, 
where the controlling factor is the private developer’s response to 
doctrinal limitations. 
 
237. Id. at 1468. 
238. Id. at 1503. 
239. Id. at 1467–68. 
240. Id. at 1469–72. 
241. Id. at 1469–70. 
242. Id. 
243. Id. 
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Furthermore, affordable housing could be used as a negotiation tool 
for the LAD’s constituents; that is, where the municipality or private 
developer fails to offer a reasonable plan to construct a fair share of 
affordable housing on the parcel of land at issue, the project cannot 
move forward—not because the judiciary said so, but because the 
community said so.  This puts the bargaining power in the hands of the 
LAD constituents, making the inclusionary element of the project a 
powerful land assembly tool. 
LADs also focus on whether to expand the parcel of land for the 
proposed development purposes.  In particular, this focus is on the 
construction of affordable housing at affordable rent prices, where 
historically it has never been realized in large-scale development 
projects.  LADs also seek to utilize the benefits of condominium 
developments.244 
Much of this proposal rests on transparency.  Poletown245—along 
with Berman and Kelo—is one of many eminent domain cases that 
illustrates the transparency problem with land assembly for the affected 
communities and is precisely why some argue local reform may need to 
be achieved through legislation.246  Under the LAD model, states 
authorize neighborhoods, similar to NID legislation, to create LADs that 
are governed through an elected board to negotiate the price of sale of 
the neighborhood or the compensation for condemnation. 
The holdout problems are presumably mitigated through a collective 
voting procedure.247  Here, community participation is at work.  The 
residents and community who have a share of the LAD have the voting 
power to cause a stalemate and stop the redevelopment project from 
moving forward.248  The blight problem would be mitigated because, 
with LADs, the taking cannot be justified for economic redevelopment 
purposes unless blight is defined “narrowly to include only 
 
244. Id. at 1469. 
[P]roperty law can retrofit a community with a condominium-like structure 
tailored to solve the problem of land assembly.  To allow people to 
overcome collective action barriers that might otherwise prevent them from 
selling their neighborhood, the LAD places them in a special district with 
the power, by a majority vote, to approve or disapprove the sale of the 
neighborhood to a developer or municipality seeking to consolidate the land 
into a single parcel. 
Id. 
245. Poletown Neighborhood Council v. City of Detroit, 304 N.W.2d 455 (Mich. 1981), 
overruled by Cnty. of Wayne v. Hathcock, 684 N.W.2d 765 (Mich. 2004). 
246. See Heller & Hills, supra note 196, at 1469 (noting Detroit never explained why the 
neighborhood’s interests were sacrificed for the common good). 
247. Id. at 1469–70. 
248. Id. at 1470. 
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neighborhoods that impose extraordinary external costs on 
outsiders.”249 
It seems plausible that a fragmentation of income status between 
landowners who share the collective voting procedure could become 
unbalanced or suspect to traditional political power struggles.250  
Atlantic Yards was a social and economic faction of different 
communities—a Berman-Kelo hybrid of middle class and low-income 
residents in Prospect Heights.  Heller and Hills argue that LADs 
overcome the just compensation question because neighbors bargain 
effectively for a share of the neighborhood’s “assembly value” and not 
simply the value of each lot.251  They go on to say that LADs can be 
designed so each individual is as well off as under current law and most 
are substantially better off.252  It is also conceivable that LADs could 
negotiate the sale of a few, or many, parcels within a neighborhood to a 
developer and, at the same time, publicly support the condemnation of 
other parcels in the neighborhood that are, say, blighted and place 
external costs on others within the locality.  Here, the LAD, on behalf of 
those in need of affordable housing, could then negotiate the 
construction of affordable housing with the developer on the parcels of 
land condemned using any number of tools discussed herein, including 
a CBA.  Indeed, LADs may be of increased interest for municipalities, 
private developers and communities looking to construct or preserve 
affordable housing where economic redevelopment projects are 
proposed. 
C. Community Development Corporation 
CDCs are nonprofit entities that seek to improve economically 
depressed inner-city neighborhoods with, among other things, 
affordable housing to recreate the social fabric of distressed areas.253  
CDCs combine several sources of equity and debt to construct 
economic development projects.  Funding usually comes from the 
Urban and Rural Economic Development Program of the U.S. 
Department of Health and Human Services Office of Community 
 
249. Id. 
250. Id. 
251. Id. 
252. Id. 
253. See Herbert J. Rubin, Renewing Hope in the Inner City: Conversations with Community-
Based Development Practitioners, 27 ADMIN. & SOC’Y 127, 137 (1995) (discussing business 
activities of CDCs that subsidize affordable housing and other community programs).  See 
generally WILSON, supra note 22 (analyzing how the shift from the urban manufacturing sector to 
the decentralized service sector has caused a substantial increase in urban poverty). 
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Services (“OCS”), the Economic Development Administration 
(“EDA”), the Small Business Administration (“SBA”) and the U.S. 
Department of Housing and Urban Development (“HUD”).254  The 
construction and preservation of affordable housing is one of the main 
priorities of CDCs before the organization moves towards broader 
economic development projects.255 
CDCs allow local residents to elect local CDC boards and empower 
the boards’ members to represent the interests of those living in a 
particular locality.256  The board then lobbies the municipality for 
services, such as affordable housing, through a meaningful engagement 
process along with the private developers, particularly if the 
condemnation threatens to raze affordable housing.257  Significantly, the 
production of affordable housing under the CDC has resulted in positive 
outcomes.258  Some studies have found that when a CDC is employed in 
a neighborhood, the quality of affordable housing is above average.  
Increasingly, CDCs have grown to go beyond affordable housing 
advocacy and, today, work alongside other forms of social services 
providers to help protect assets for families living within the locality 
where the CDC is located.259 
CDCs can purchase buildings from the existing landowners that are 
subject to condemnation and propose to refurbish the buildings as 
leverage to stop an incoming private developer from demolishing the 
structures.  However, some CDCs are unwilling to risk the investment 
or unable to improve the property through capital investments for fear 
that the property is targeted for condemnation.  The CDCs could buy the 
existing blighted property from the landowners before condemnation 
and then convey the property back to the private developer on the 
 
254. Michael H. Schill, Assessing the Role of Community Development Corporations in Inner 
City Economic Development, 255 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 753, 769 (1996). 
255. See AVIS C. VIDAL, REBUILDING COMMUNITIES: A NATIONAL STUDY OF URBAN 
COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT CORPORATIONS 76 (1992) (noting that CDCs typically begin their 
economic development activities with housing). 
256. See Paul S. Grogan, Proof Positive: A Community-Based Solution to America’s 
Affordable Housing Crisis, 7 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 159, 159 (1996) (noting that community 
residents govern CDCs). 
257. But see Ram A. Cnaan, Neighborhood-Representing Organizations: How Democratic 
Are They?, 65 SOC. SERVICE REV. 614, 621 (1991) (“[P]rofessionalization and detachment from 
residents is more the norm than the exception.”); Randy Stoecker, The CDC Model of Urban 
Redevelopment: A Critique and an Alternative, 19 J. URB. AFF. 1, 8–10 (1997) (arguing that 
communities do not actually control CDCs). 
258. See VIDAL, supra note 255, at 78 (finding housing development was the least risky 
activity of CDCs, with failure rates ranging from 17% to 38%). 
259. William M. Rohe, Do Community Development Corporations Live up to Their Billing? A 
Review and Critique of the Research Findings, in SHELTER & SOCIETY: THEORY, RESEARCH, 
AND POLICY FOR NONPROFIT HOUSING 177, 182–83 (C. Theodore Koebel ed., 1998). 
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condition that the property be refurbished and rented at below-market 
rates for the affected community.  In return, the CDC promises to 
publicly support the developer.  This may require a small-scale CBA to 
strengthen the promise and the subsequent construction of affordable 
housing. 
The CDC could also negotiate with the developer to purchase the 
land with strings attached.  This would entail persuading the developer 
to purchase the land adjacent or adjoining the property where the 
condemnation is to take place and use the land to construct new 
affordable housing units.  This would involve a costly, but worthwhile, 
relocation if the relocation is negotiated within the economic 
redevelopment project and mitigates the effects of exclusionary eminent 
domain. 
CDCs also hold the power to persuade developers to acquire the land 
and quickly resell the properties to the community at a discount or to 
buy the land and immediately sell it to the CDC so it can construct 
affordable housing with its investments.  Furthermore, the developer 
can negotiate a long-term lease to build new affordable housing 
structures with the affected community.  The CDC, on behalf of the 
affected community, would pay the developer the property rent.  The 
rent, therefore, would be put towards development and maintenance of 
affordable housing in lieu of a bank loan.  A thirty-year lease, for 
example, would finance the leasehold to make available the profits 
necessary for development and maintenance of the affordable housing 
for the affected community who otherwise may be displaced. 
The CDC could also negotiate with a private developer to acquire the 
blighted property threatened by condemnation on the condition that the 
private developer convert the property into affordable housing units.  In 
exchange, the CDC would approve of the condemnation and economic 
redevelopment project.  This may ensure the existing blighted property 
is not demolished and sold or rented at the market rate.  This would 
work like a CBA, but with fewer stakeholders involved.  Since the CDC 
is controlled by the community, the CDC can refuse to raise rents in a 
newly constructed economic redevelopment project in an effort to 
preserve the existing affordable housing for community members, 
thereby thwarting the loss of affordable housing. 
CDCs may play an ex ante role that is at the heart of the inclusionary 
eminent domain framework because their purpose is to enter into 
distressed neighborhoods that may be vulnerable to condemnation.  By 
employing a CDC in low-income neighborhoods and establishing 
procedural steps to take if and when a municipality begins eminent 
domain proceedings, the community would have a plan in place to 
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thwart displacement, not the entire redevelopment project.  This would 
position the CDC to negotiate the relocation process within the 
proposed economic redevelopment project.  Again, inclusionary 
eminent domain seeks to constructively facilitate, not halt, 
redevelopment. 
In some states CDCs have been granted the power of eminent 
domain.260  However, CDCs are not designed, specifically, for the 
purpose of exercising or opposing eminent domain.  In contrast, LADs 
are designed to focus the community on eminent domain and 
subsequent sale of the neighborhood—an issue no resident can or wants 
to ignore.261  Indeed, CDCs could serve as a mechanism to organize the 
initial stages of the formation of an LAD that is dedicated to creating 
inclusionary affordable housing for low-income families.262  The CDC, 
however, would not receive shares of the revenue after the land was 
condemned and would not have a majority veto over the decision to 
condemn.263  The LAD would, presumably, authorize both of those 
things. Nonetheless, the imposition of CDCs under an inclusionary 
eminent domain framework ought to be strongly considered by 
communities. 
D. Community Land Trust 
CLTs are modeled on a landowner and property ownership scheme.  
The title to the land that sits underneath the property is held by the CLT, 
while the title to the property, such as an affordable housing 
development, is held by the community.  The CLT is the ground lessor 
and the individual is the ground lessee in the ownership of fee interest 
of the land.  The house, however, cannot be sold beyond a set resale 
price, usually set at the maximum.  In CLT programs, the municipality 
or the CLT usually has the right of first refusal, particularly with regard 
to the purchase of affordable housing units.  This scheme ensures that 
the CLT can preserve affordable housing permanently. 
CLTs have been enacted under section 213 of the Housing and 
Community Development Act of 1992.264  The basic benefits of the 
CLT give the community the ability to repurchase residential structures 
 
260. See Asmara Tekle Johnson, Privatizing Eminent Domain: The Delegation of a Very 
Public Power to Private, Non-Profit and Charitable Corporations, 56 AM. U. L. REV. 455, 492–
97 (2007) (describing the private nondelegation doctrine within the context of eminent domain). 
261. See Heller & Hills, supra note 196, at 1518. 
262. See id. 
263. Id. at 518–19. 
264.  Housing and Community Development Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-550, § 213, 106 
Stat. 3672, 3757 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 12773). 
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located on the CLT’s land in the event ownership is sold.  Doing so 
allows for future investment, such as below-market renters or buyers, 
and the opportunity to gain access to affordable housing.265  Under 
inclusionary eminent domain, CLTs would operate within the physical 
boundaries of, say, a proposed economic redevelopment project where 
eminent domain is being exercised or proposed.  CLT members would 
live within the boundaries of the CLT and have certain voting 
powers.266  The area that the CLT covers is broader than a 
neighborhood locality and could include an entire town, city or county.  
Residents essentially control the process by sitting on the CLT’s board 
of directors, serving as the drivers of meaningful engagement with the 
private developer and the municipality.  Members either reside on the 
land of the CLT, in the properties of the CLT or within the locality of 
the CLT. 
Although a CLT may acquire and also expand its land holdings to 
increase the supply of affordable housing, it may also acquire a single 
parcel of land to develop affordable housing.267  The CLT could also 
impose its power to negotiate the sale of a parcel of land within an 
economic redevelopment project on the condition that the private 
developer construct affordable housing, particularly if a substantial 
portion of the existing affordable housing would be lost from the 
condemnation.  In the event land is acquired through eminent domain 
and transferred from one private owner to another, the CLT may have 
the power to concentrate its land holding within a small area of land to 
ensure affordable housing is either preserved or constructed.268  In other 
words, once the boundaries for an economic redevelopment project are 
finalized, the community (represented by the CLT), the private 
developer and the municipality can negotiate goals for affordable 
housing through the conveyance of concentrated or scattered sites for 
 
265. See Stacey Janeda Pastel, Community Land Trusts: A Promising Alternative for 
Affordable Housing, 6 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 293, 301–12 (1991) (discussing whether a 
CLT’s option to repurchase is an invalid restraint on alienation). 
266. Id. at 315. 
267. See generally Christopher A. Seeger, The Fixed-Price Preemptive Right in the 
Community Land Trust Lease: A Valid Response to the Housing Crisis or an Invalid Restraint on 
Alienation?, 11 CARDOZO L. REV. 471 (1989) (noting that CLTs remove land from the 
speculative market and create affordable housing for low income individuals). 
268. Id.  CLTs expanded in the 1980s, particularly in urban neighborhoods, in an effort to 
thwart condemnation of land for development purposes.  Julie Farrell Curtin & Lance Bocarsly, 
CLTs: A Growing Trend in Affordable Home Ownership, 17 J. AFFORDABLE HOUSING & 
COMMUNITY DEV. L. 367, 371 (2008).  In 1981, Cincinnati laid claim to the first CLT in the 
United States, named the Community Land Cooperative of Cincinnati.  Id.  The cooperative was 
an association of churches organized to stop the condemnation of land and the displacement of 
low-income people, predominantly African-American neighborhoods.  Id. 
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sale or rental units at affordable rates within the locality. 
In 1989, a well-known CLT worked in collaboration with the City of 
Boston.  The City-CLT partnership was formed when the Dudley Street 
Neighborhood Initiative (“DSNI”), the CLT, was permitted to exercise 
eminent domain to redevelop and revitalize the Dudley Street 
neighborhood, a blighted, dilapidated inner-city area in Boston with 
widespread property abandonment.269  However, many landowners held 
out, refusing to sell.  In response to the City’s plan to condemn areas of 
land within the Dudley neighborhood, the DSNI demanded to take 
control of the area of land planned for condemnation.270  The DSNI’s 
strategy was to consolidate the vacant and dilapidated properties as a 
foundation for economic redevelopment that suited the wants and needs 
of the community—rather than simply doing what the City of Boston 
had envisioned.271  Understandably, given the divisiveness inherent in 
municipal takings of property, the City of Boston was first reluctant, but 
then agreed, to give the community the power to condemn the land and 
exercise eminent domain. 
After some negotiations, the City authorized the DSNI to use eminent 
domain to acquire the land for economic redevelopment, thereby 
avoiding the lengthy process of acquiring tax-delinquent and abandoned 
properties.272  In creating a CLT, the DSNI assembled 132 parcels of 
land between 1991 and 1994.273  During that time period, nearly 400 
single-family, duplex and triplex affordable housing units were built in 
the locality.  The DSNI preserved 740 houses by using its funds to 
refurbish existing structures that needed repairs. 
E. Land Bank 
LABs are inventories of surplus land that are primarily established by 
redevelopment authorities or municipalities to manage undeveloped 
land until the market spurs potential buyers to develop it.  Over the last 
forty years, local governments have designed this new land assembly 
tool to revitalize blighted, vacant and abandoned property that threatens 
to decrease the value of the land.  LABs focus on vacant, abandoned 
 
269. See PETER MEDOFF & HOLLY SKLAR, STREETS OF HOPE: THE FALL AND RISE OF AN 
URBAN NEIGHBORHOOD 43 (1994) (noting that 30% of the Dudley neighborhood is vacant; the 
remaining population is characterized by low income, low education levels and high 
unemployment). 
270. Id. at 126. 
271. Id. at 120. 
272. Id. at 119 (noting that DSNI was the first community group in the nation to win the right 
of eminent domain). 
273. DOUGLAS R. PORTER, URBAN LAND INST., EMINENT DOMAIN: AN IMPORTANT TOOL 
FOR COMMUNITY REVITALIZATION 24 (2007). 
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and tax-delinquent parcels of land in urban areas, and the general goal is 
to reinvigorate these properties and cultivate them as assets for 
community development and redevelopment.274  Land Banks function 
best in situations where the needs and concerns of the community are 
not being met; they respond to those needs by converting vacant and 
abandoned land into assets that contribute to the health and vitality of 
the community.275 
Vacant, blighted and abandoned property is, invariably, affordable 
for those who may have no other means to afford shelter, despite the 
fact that such practices may be considered a form of squatting or illegal 
occupancy.  The property is usually inferior and becomes a target for 
condemnation.  But municipalities, for many different reasons, have 
neglected to invest resources into the properties, fearing that the costs 
put towards revitalizing the areas will not lure private developers to 
make future investments in the property.  The properties are also subject 
to illegal occupancy and under-maintenance from slumlords who thrive 
on dilapidated buildings to provide a source of affordable housing for 
the poor in the inner-cities—many times in relative proximity to jobs 
and transportation—where it would otherwise not be available due to 
other factors, such as gentrification of other areas within the city. 
LABs were initially proposed as a substantial land-use planning tool 
when authorized at the state and local levels of government.276  More 
accurately, the LAB was created for land use control purposes so that 
“land inventory could be used to impact the costs of land for private and 
public development.”277  Indeed, the LAB was developed to deal with a 
range of social and cultural problems; it “was limited only by the 
creative imagination of social and urban planners.”278 
Charles Haar envisioned public authorities that—by the acquisition of 
parceled land and undeveloped land—employ LABs to directly impact 
the fluctuation of land values and allow local governments to undertake 
land use control.279  In the face of nuisance laws, exclusionary zoning 
 
274. See generally Frank S. Alexander, Land Bank Strategies for Renewing Urban Land, 14 J. 
AFFORDABLE HOUSING & COMMUNITY DEV. L. 140 (2004) (discussing how LABs can operate 
as a local governmental authority to turn liabilities into assets). 
275. Id. at 141. 
276. Id. 
277. Id. at 143. 
278. Id. 
279. See Wanted: Two Federal Levers for Urban Land Use—Land Banks and Urbank: Paper 
submitted to Subcomm. on Hous. Panels of H. Comm. on Banking and Currency, 92d Cong. 927–
940 (1971) (statement of Charles M. Haar, Professor of Law, Harvard Law School), cited in CTR. 
FOR URBAN POLICY RESEARCH, LAND USE CONTROLS: PRESENT PROBLEMS AND FUTURE 
REFORM 365–79 (David Listokin ed., 1974).  The first LAB was established in the 1970s in St. 
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and urban renewal, LABs served as a new tool for dealing with the 
inefficient use of land.280 
However, redevelopment authorities—faced with the rapid decline of 
some inner-city parcels of land—did not reclaim or redevelop the 
areas.281  Nor were private developers convinced by market forces to 
invest in the areas.  Therefore, as a governmental entity, LABs assemble 
and bank land to be converted into productive, short-term and long-term 
uses.282  Indeed, the tool expedites the urban redevelopment process in 
declining areas and puts the land to use for other purposes or in 
conjunction with other land assembly tools, such as CDCs or CLTs.  As 
a matter of fee simple ownership, the blighted property that sits on the 
land is reserved by its owners, but stands idle with no apparent 
productive use.283 
Since LABs are flexible in form and function, they can be adjusted to 
various land assembly purposes.284  Here, in the face of condemnation 
that threatens the loss of affordable housing, LABs can construct or 
preserve affordable housing where it already exists, albeit in a 
physically inadequate form.285  If used to control urban sprawl caused, 
in part, by exclusionary zoning, LABs could be adjusted to fix the 
exclusionary eminent domain problem by serving as an inclusionary 
housing development tool by banking, and then earmarking, the land for 
affordable housing so it may be targeted for economic 
redevelopment.286 
LABs, like CDCs, can acquire land for purposes of developing 
 
Louis, Missouri by the St. Louis Revitalization Authority.  Redevelopment authorities historically 
have held the power to issue tax-exempt financing and exercise the power of eminent domain to 
revitalize dilapidated and blighted land.  See generally Kenneth R. Langsdorf, Urban Decay, 
Property Tax Delinquency: A Solution in St. Louis, 5 URB. LAW. 729 (1973) (discussing the tax 
breaks and power of eminent domain that statutory redevelopment corporations in Missouri 
enjoy). 
280. Haar, supra note 279, at 933. 
281. See Alexander, supra note 274, at 142 (noting the forces that inhibited public 
development authorities in efforts to reclaim and redevelop blighted and tax-delinquent 
properties). 
282. Id. 
283. See id. (noting that LABs are comprised of both privately and publicly owned “stagnant” 
homes). 
284. See id. at 142, 147 (noting that there “is no single form or function to land banks” and 
that this “variation . . . is essential” for LABs to function). 
285. See generally Patricia A. Hemann, Land Banking Tax Delinquent Property: Reform and 
Revitalization, 27 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 517 (1978) (discussing the use of LABs to revitalize urban 
areas which have become blighted and filled with abandoned properties). 
286. See generally HARVEY L. FLECHNER, LAND BANKING IN THE CONTROL OF URBAN 
DEVELOPMENT (1974) (providing an overview of land bank programs including their functions 
and role in urban redevelopment). 
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affordable housing.  LABs and CDCs operate similarly in that both 
advance acquisition of parcels of land for future purposes of affordable 
housing development.287  The meaningful engagement process takes 
place largely between the municipality, public authority or state agency 
banking the land.  
The LAB combines elements of long-term proposals and project-
specific approaches to banking land.288  Thus, in the face of the threat of 
exclusionary eminent domain, CDCs can bank land for future purposes 
by acquiring, holding and designating sites for affordable housing 
development for low-income and moderate-income families who may 
be displaced by condemnation elsewhere. 
The LAB can also be designed for a single public purpose, such as 
economic redevelopment.289  The land banking process focuses on a 
single geographic area for the purpose of acquiring and assembling land 
for, say, affordable housing development.290  Since land assemblage in 
targeted, single parcels of land is unavailable or difficult to obtain by 
way of open-market acquisitions, the exercise of eminent domain can be 
delegated to or exercised on behalf of the LAB.291  In the event a 
private developer requests that a municipality condemn land for 
economic redevelopment purposes, land banking can also induce the 
development of affordable housing by providing the public financial 
subsidies in the form of tax-exempt financing, low-interest loans or tax 
abatements for the private developer in exchange for the affordable 
housing development on the land targeted for condemnation.292  Indeed, 
the key components of the LAB scheme are: (1) “public acquisition and 
holding of land as a form of land use . . . control” and (2) “the public 
acquisition of land for transfer to private third parties for use and 
development.”293  In the context of inclusionary eminent domain, LABs 
can play a significant role in staving off the exclusionary effects of 
condemnation because the municipality—already holding property for 
future investment—can spur private developers to utilize the existing 
property for affordable housing. 
 
287. See Alexander, supra note 274, at 145 (contrasting the acquisition of property by 
nonprofit housing development corporations to that of LABs). 
288. Id. 
289. Id. 
290. Id. 
291. Id. 
292. Id.  See generally Langsdorf, supra note 279 (discussing the use of public financial 
subsidies and eminent domain to encourage private redevelopment by third parties). 
293. Alexander, supra note 274, at 145; see also Richard P. Fishman & Robert D. Gross, 
Public Land Banking: A New Praxis for Urban Growth, 23 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 897, 899 
(1972) (discussing the modern goals and purposes of land banking). 
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In fact, some of the earliest proposals for LABs sought to assemble 
large amounts of land as a form of local land use planning, while other 
proposals dabbled with the idea of giving the redevelopment authority 
the power of eminent domain.294  But, for constitutional reasons, many 
LABs are not designed with the authority to condemn land—that power 
still remains with the municipality.  And, although the exercise of 
eminent domain is sometimes suggested for LABs, municipalities rarely 
grant it.295 
However, the LAB does have the authority to acquire properties from 
municipalities, such as foreclosed or surplus properties or as a result of 
voluntary donations and transfers from private owners.296  Communities 
subject to threats of losing affordable housing to condemnation may, 
therefore, have the ability to acquire ownership over a parcel of land 
that has been banked by the municipality and use the land as leverage in 
negotiations with private developers.  The purchase or lease of property 
on the open market would allow the LAB to negotiate the purchase of 
neglected property from a private owner.297  Communities are not the 
only stakeholders that could acquire the banked land from the 
municipality; private developers could also acquire the properties. 
The holding of land by the municipality could lure the private 
developer to enter into negotiations to complete the project with the 
affordable housing interests of the affected community.  The LAB also 
focuses on transfers of property at nominal prices to facilitate the 
construction or preservation of affordable housing where it is threatened 
by condemnation.298  A LAB often transfers property “in anticipation 
that the transferee will undertake certain commitments concerning 
development and future use of the property.”299  An offer made by the 
municipality to a private developer to acquire the banked land prior to 
commencing eminent domain proceedings could ensure that affordable 
housing is refurbished and has significant positive impacts on the 
affordable housing market within an economic redevelopment project. 
The potential for an inclusionary relationship between LABs and 
other land assembly tools proposed in this Article is significant, in part, 
due to the fact that corporations or individuals can apply to purchase 
property from the LAB.300  Some land banks may give preference to 
 
294. See Alexander, supra note 274, at 143. 
295. Id. at 150, 156. 
296. Id. at 150–51. 
297. Id. at 152. 
298. Id. at 154. 
299. Id. at 163. 
300. Id. at 160. 
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non-profit corporations that plan to use the property to create affordable 
housing, while others make the property available to private 
corporations.301  Thus, LABs that operate within an area targeted for 
condemnation have the authority to transfer the property to a private 
developer who plans for economic redevelopment of the land.  The 
process of banking, then transferring, the land establishes a sales price 
for the land sold to a private developer to use for constructing 
affordable housing at a reasonable percentage of the standard price.302  
And since the LAB is primarily concerned with transferring land to 
transferees whose primary goal is to hold ownership of the land for 
future resale, the sale of the properties to a private developer benefitting 
from the exercise of eminent domain may allow the developer—
incentivized by tax-exemptions and other conditions—to sell or rent the 
property to the affected community at below-market rates to ensure the 
community is not displaced by exclusionary eminent domain. 
F. Neighborhood Improvement District 
NIDs303 are one of many variations of improvement districts that 
exist throughout the United States, including Business Improvement 
Districts (“BIDs”),304 Block-Level Improvement Districts (“BLIDs”)305 
and Private Neighborhood Associations (“PNAs”).306  Local 
 
301. Id. 
302. The St. Louis Land Bank sells the land to non-profit entities who will utilize the property 
for a “strong public purpose” at 50% of the standard price.  Id. 
303. This section focuses on the NID Act under Pennsylvania law.  See Neighborhood 
Improvement District Act, 73 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 831–40 (2013).  This is primarily to simplify 
the conversation and for convenience since I am acquainted with the NID legislation in 
Pennsylvania. 
304. For a comprehensive discussion of BIDs, see ROBERT ELLICKSON & VICKI BEEN, LAND 
USE CONTROLS 619–34 (2005) (discussing the concepts and practical utility of special 
assessments and BIDs); Wayne Batchis, Privatized Government in a Diverse Urban 
Neighborhood: Mt. Airy Business Improvement District, 3 DREXEL L. REV. 109 (2010); Richard 
Briffault, A Government for Our Time? Business Improvement Districts and Urban Governance, 
99 COLUM. L. REV. 365, 366–74 (1999) [hereinafter Briffault, Urban Governance]; Richard 
Briffault, The Business Improvement District Comes of Age, 3 DREXEL L. REV. 19 (2010); Gerald 
E. Frug, The Seductions of Form, 3 DREXEL L. REV. 11, 17 (2010); Robert Stokes, The 
Challenges of Using BIDs in Lower-Income Areas: The Case of Germantown, Philadelphia, 3 
DREXEL L. REV. 325 (2010); Thomas J. Vicino, New Boundaries of Urban Governance: An 
Analysis of Philadelphia’s University City Improvement District, 3 DREXEL L. REV. 339 (2010). 
305. BLIDs are residential communities similar to BIDS that enable residents to acquire 
resources such as local public goods.  Within inclusionary eminent domain, BLIDs are perhaps 
yet another tool to place more pressure on private developers to include services to the displaced 
communities where eminent domain is used.  Importantly, a BLID would focus its attention 
towards protecting the rights of dissenting landowners and displaced communities.  Robert C. 
Ellickson, New Institutions for Old Neighborhoods, 48 DUKE L.J. 75, 97–98 (1998). 
306. PNAs may serve as another alternative tool for inclusionary eminent domain.  PNAs 
function as condominium-like communities.  PNAs are made up of concurrent supermajorities of 
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governance models, such as NIDS, are enabled by state regulations and 
designed as group property institutions that can be retrofitted to an 
existing community where eminent domain is considered for economic 
redevelopment.  However, this Article focuses on the NID due to its 
extremely local design and its focus on improvements for residential 
property owners and renters within a designated area.  The designated 
NID area could potentially be drawn for purposes of alleviating the 
exclusionary impact of eminent domain in high-density areas of cities. 
NIDs are geographic areas within a municipality where a special 
assessment is levied on all designated property, other than tax-exempt 
property, for the purpose of promoting the economic and general 
welfare of the district and the municipality.  The NID funds are utilized 
to supplement city services, such as streetlights, managing parking lots 
and other security measures.307  Here, the NID assessment may finance 
the provision of positive externalities that generally benefit the assessed 
area or construction of an improvement, such as affordable housing, that 
would generate economic activity, increase property values or generally 
create an inclusive environment.308  Unlike BIDs, NIDs are primarily 
created to improve residential, not commercial or business, areas within 
a locality.  NIDs seek to fix some of the collective action problems 
found in areas that are both commercial and residential and are thus 
composed of different-sized structures that serve different functions.309  
 
existing owners and renters of residential and commercial properties.  The Association would 
enable members to coerce individual owners to join.  The board would have the power to sell 
changes in use, such as selling the community as a whole for redevelopment.  Nelson notes that 
the creation of such associations in already established neighborhoods is very difficult because 
“the transaction costs of assembling unanimous neighborhood consents voluntarily would be 
prohibitive.”  Robert H. Nelson, Privatizing the Neighborhood: A Proposal to Replace Zoning 
with Private Collective Property Rights to Existing Neighborhoods, 7 GEO. MASON L. REV. 827, 
833–34 (1999). 
307. Briffault, Urban Governance, supra note 304, at 368–69. 
308. See generally Kenneth A. Stahl, Neighborhood Empowerment and the Future of the City, 
161 U. PA. L. REV. 939 (2013).  Stahl elaborates on the concerns of authors such as Ellickson and 
Liebmann, arguing that because a “neighborhood has unfettered ability to control its own land 
use,” use of neighborhood controlled zoning results in “not in my backyard” (“NIMBY”) 
impulses and exclusionary practices that deny in-demand resources, such as low-income housing 
developments.  Id. at 995. 
309. Heller and Hills focus their LAD proposal on the intra-group exploitation problem that 
NIDs seek to overcome.  Heller & Hills, supra note 196, at 1521. 
[T]he opportunities for intra-group exploitation are high in a neighborhood composed 
of different-sized structures serving different functions.  The possibility that residential 
owners would burden commercial structures with onerous restrictions is matched only 
by the possibility that commercial owners would burden residential owners with 
noxious uses.  Even among residential owners, the owners of large and small buildings 
would have persistently different interests that would invite intra-neighborhood 
squabbling. 
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Further, blight removal is not a prerequisite for establishing a NID.  The 
decision-making body is also representative of the residents within the 
NID. 
The municipal corporation—a body or board authorized to enact 
ordinances or resolutions, such as a City Council—has the power to 
establish an authority to administer the NID improvements.310  The 
municipal corporation can also choose an existing CDC located within 
the NID designated area to administer the funds for improvements.  A 
governing body is created by group representatives from the 
community—called the neighborhood improvement district 
management association (“NIDMA”)—that levies assessments and 
makes other decisions concerning the improvements of the 
neighborhood when there is not a local CDC. 
The revenue generated is funneled back into the NID fund and 
dispersed for neighborhood improvements.311  Although NIDs are 
primarily designed to upgrade and maintain residential areas, some NID 
legislation allows for commercial property within or abutting the NID 
area, and thus local business owners are sometimes members of the 
NIDMA.312  However, the purpose of the NID, in contrast to the BID, is 
to ensure that improvements districts do not center primarily on 
business development, but on residential neighborhood development. 
In low-income neighborhoods, some states allow the NIDMA to 
exempt residential property owners from any special assessment fee 
levied and instead levy a higher assessment on participating businesses 
within the NID.  Other states require residents to pay a nominal amount, 
such as $1, to prevent burdening an already low-income community.  
Residents and business owners can petition the City Council to 
designate the NID where the municipality has not taken such action, but 
 
Id. 
310. See Neighborhood Improvement District Act, 73 PA. CONS. STAT. § 834(1) (2013) 
(“Every municipal corporation shall have the power . . . [t]o establish within the municipality an 
area or areas designated as an NID.”). 
311. See id. § 837(b)(1). 
The NIDMA shall, upon approval by the governing body of the municipality, have the 
power to assess property owners within the NID a special assessment fee.  Revenues 
from the fee shall be accounted for and used by the NIDMA to make improvements 
and provide programs and services within the NID as authorized by this act.  Where the 
district established is a BID, the NIDMA shall have the authority to exempt residential 
property owners from any special assessment fees levied. 
Id. 
312. See id. § 834(10) (explaining that the municipal corporation has the power “[t]o levy an 
assessment fee on property owners located within an NID needed to finance additional 
supplemental programs, services and improvements to be provided or made by the NIDMA”). 
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the ultimate decision to establish a NID rests with the municipal 
corporation.  The responsibility for drawing boundaries rests with the 
entity that proposes the NID, which many times includes a variety of 
local neighborhood stakeholders and residents.313 
The initial NID proposal to the municipal corporation must include 
proposed revenue sources for financing the proposed improvements 
within its boundaries.  Revenue for the NID is primarily generated from 
the assessments, but some states have enacted NID legislation to allow 
the municipal corporation to issue and generate bonds, notes or 
guarantees to finance improvements within the NID.314  The bonds may 
be retired by a further assessment on the property owners on an 
equitable basis.  The municipal corporation also has the power to 
advance some of the funds to the NIDMA, or to the local CDC, to carry 
out the purposes and goals of the NID. 
These provisions within NID legislation are what make NIDs more 
powerful than other small-scale neighborhood improvement areas with 
minimal streams of revenue.  The issuance of bonds and other forms of 
monies, including the authority to “[a]ppropriate and expend NID funds 
which would include any Federal, State or municipal funds received by 
the NIDMA” from the City Council is a useful, and perhaps attractive, 
tool for private developers seeking to invest in affordable housing 
developments in the community.315  Those funds can be “expend[ed] in 
accordance with the specific provisions of the municipal enabling 
ordinance” establishing the NID.316  
Given the close proximity and interaction with the municipal 
authority and private developers under the NID scheme, NIDs have a 
strong incentive to eliminate abandoned and blighted buildings using 
their partial authority to condemn property through eminent domain.317  
Under state or local legislation, a NID has the authority to identify 
deteriorating buildings, outline a detailed proposal for rehabilitation of 
the buildings within a locality and condemn land to acquire and then 
refurbish or construct new affordable housing.318 
 
313. See id. § 835(c)(1) (stating the plan must include “[a] map indicating the boundaries, by 
street, of the proposed NID; however, a designated property may not be included in more than 
one NID”); see also id. § 835(a)(1) (providing that “[t]he governing body of the municipality or 
any municipal businesses or residents or combination thereof may initiate action to establish an 
NID or NIDs”). 
314. Id. § 834(7). 
315. Id. § 837(a)(8). 
316. Id. § 834(3) (internal punctuation omitted). 
317. See id. § 834(6) (stating the municipal corporation has the power to acquire property 
through eminent domain in order to “mak[e] physical improvements within the NID”). 
318. See generally id. § 834 (outlining the powers municipal corporations may bestow on 
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The initial stages of the NID proposal would need to explicitly state 
that one of the primary improvements the NID seeks is a fair share 
percentage of affordable housing to be constructed or preserved on the 
site condemned for development.  Private developers will likely be open 
to the fair share option because most states have NIDs with alternative 
revenue streams that would assist in the financing of the inclusionary 
housing. 
From an ex ante perspective, the proposed use of eminent domain 
proceedings by a municipality should spur the affected community to 
consider the designation of a NID within the economic redevelopment 
project area.  Then, from an ex post position, the local CDC, in 
collaboration with the city council and private developer, would 
meaningfully engage.  This would entail meeting to map out and draw 
what portion of the redevelopment project would be designated as a 
NID and what portion of revenue from the special assessment and other 
local, state and federal funds would go towards substituting the 
anticipated loss of housing with new affordable developments. 
Most NID legislation also requires a comprehensive plan that draws 
“[a] map indicating the boundaries, by street, of the proposed NID.”319  
Here, the private developer and municipality can offer numerous ways 
to assist the NID area with development of affordable housing in that 
area.  The funds accessible through the NID from local and state taxes 
would assist in the maintenance and repair of the areas surrounding the 
affordable housing, such as street cleaning, light maintenance and other 
local amenities, thus working to mitigate blight and decay over time. 
Similar to the CBA, the creation of a NID can be used as a public 
approval mechanism: We will support the taking of property for 
economic redevelopment purposes in exchange for the creation of a 
NID and designation of its powers, under applicable NID legislation, to 
a local CDC to improve the area, including the oversight of 
development of affordable housing units with the private developer.  
While CBAs bind the parties through a number of promises, including 
housing, on a contractual document, the NID places a structural 
organization within the economic redevelopment project area that helps 
maintain—at least to a certain extent—the integrity of the 
neighborhood.  Indeed, the prospect of righting the wrongs of the past 
by giving back a certain degree of community empowerment through 
meaningful engagement, participation and public approval within an 
economic redevelopment project is an exciting, but still evolving, 
 
NIDs). 
319. See id. § 835(c)(1). 
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phenomenon under an inclusionary eminent domain model.  Overlaying 
a NID boundary within an economic redevelopment project is 
increasingly becoming an important tool in the post-Kelo era for 
constructing and preserving affordable housing. 
CONCLUSION 
This Article calls for developers, municipalities and communities to 
rethink how to plan for inclusion.  Inclusionary eminent domain is a 
new normative concept to help us rethink how to fix the exclusionary 
eminent domain phenomenon and remedy condemnations that threaten 
the loss of affordable housing and displacement of low-income 
communities.  Heightened judicial review, as proposed by Dana, in and 
of itself, may not solve the ubiquitous problems of inefficient land 
assembly and shortage of affordable housing.  Post-Kelo legislation 
barring condemnations for economic redevelopment is not likely to 
adequately solve the exclusionary phenomenon.  Indeed, this Article 
makes a normative case by proposing CBAs, LADs, CDCs, CLTs, 
LABs and NIDs as crucial tools that are part of this broader framework 
of inclusion to guide municipalities, private developers and 
communities on how to assemble land taken through eminent domain.  
However, the question that remains is whether the legal doctrine 
framing takings law can embody the norms proposed in this Article.  
The model proposed here is just one of many steps in what is an 
organic and evolving paradigm in takings law and economic 
redevelopment.  The next phase of this paradigm very well may lead to 
state legislatures considering how to structure statutes that require the 
practices advocated here, city councils amending ordinances to mandate 
the implementation of the tools or courts who may want to uphold the 
inclusionary practices by ordering the municipalities to utilize some of 
the tools as a matter of state constitutional law or zoning enabling law.  
This, of course, would require a comprehensive assessment of the 
constitutionality of legislatively enforced and judicially mandated 
inclusionary eminent domain, which would also substantiate the 
normative position set forth in this Article. 
This Article, though, seeks to start that conversation and to 
acknowledge the realization that public use, in the most local 
community sense, is an integral part of the exercise of takings for 
economic redevelopment.  Inclusionary eminent domain is a framework 
to nurture and facilitate the process. 
